NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY

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NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY: DEFINITION AND HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF NATIONALISM

Ideas and definitions of nationalism are as much a product of scholarship on nationalism as they are the creation of nationalists. Many scholars of nationalism have been (and some still are) nationalists in the sense that they make certain claims on groups of people in order to define their belonging to one or another nation. Key thinkers have developed and refined the concepts and definitions of nations and nationalism, their work and lives interwoven with the major events of the past two centuries. This introduction will set up some of the main definitions and, at the same time, locate the conceptual debates within the discipline of nationalism studies.

Indeed, the emergence of a discipline in an era of nation building explains much of the ambiguity of scholarship on nationalism. Many scholars of nationalism have been (and some still are) nationalists in the sense that they make certain claims on groups of people in order to define their belonging to one or another nation. Key thinkers have developed and refined the concepts and definitions of nations and nationalism, their work and lives interwoven with the major events of the past two centuries. This introduction will set up some of the main definitions and, at the same time, locate the conceptual debates within the discipline of nationalism studies.

Of how nations and nationalism emerged. But there is also another underlying question of causality: whether nations and nationalism are in part the product of a professional interest in nation building by scholar-statesmen. From the post-Napoleonic years of Romanticism, liberalism, and nationalism and the concept of national boundaries and self-determination, and the state collapse, nationalism has proven resilient both as a conceptual tool and as a lived reality. Nationalism as a discipline of study has tried repeatedly to reconcile the reality with the concept, but cannot do so because the discipline itself is embedded in the reality it seeks to analyze.

A dual approach to nationalism that first emerged in the nineteenth century also remains firmly embedded in scholarship and nationalist practices today. Nationalism, in its many forms across the globe, from the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and Asia to the Americas, has at its core both an ethnic (cultural) and civic (political) component, combining culture, language, ancestry, and religion with institutional, geopolitical, economic, ideological, and social processes of inclusion and exclusion. While the emphasis classically has been on ethnic or civic forms of nationalism, there is now a growing consensus in nationalism studies that no type of nationalism is mutually exclusive and, equally, one form can influence or borrow from another. Moreover, it is possible to see this shift toward mutually inclusive forms of nationalism in the light of another paradigmatic shift from content to process: rather than being a static set of ideas, nationalism can instead be defined as a set of processes, of invented traditions in the Hobsbawmian sense and “imagined communities” in the famous phrase of Benedict Anderson. Finally, a third related tension between universalism and exceptionalism can be observed in a shift away from the claims of post–World War II scholars, who explained violence and genocide as products of deviant or exceptional forms of nationalism, toward comparative and transnational approaches that break down the exceptionalism paradigm. The following sections will summarize the main contributions of scholarship on nationalism by discussing each of these three tensions—ethnic versus civic, static versus process, and universalist versus exceptionalist—and linking them to key concepts such as citizenship, nationality, and the state.

ETHNIC VERSUS CIVIC

The ethnic-civic dichotomy has been used as an analytical tool to explain differences in concepts of nationality and citizenship, but it has also been applied to historical differences between nations. France and Germany have classically been regarded as the respective models of civic and ethnic nationalism following the ideas of the French scholar Ernest Renan (1823–1892) and the German

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scholar Friedrich Meinecke (1862–1954). In fact, the concept of civic nationhood dates back further than Renan to French republican nationalism, which made the state and its institutions, rather than religion or ancestry, the basis of a shared fraternity, liberty, and equality between citizens. Following France’s defeat in the 1870–1871 Franco-Prussian War, Renan launched an attack on the old republicanism that in his view had weakened the French nation. In his famous lecture at the Sorbonne, “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” (What is a Nation?), in 1882, Renan argued that members of the nation either choose or reject categories of race, language, territory, and religion to create the nation through “a daily plebiscite.” His model of a voluntary nation, or Willensnation, was both an attack on Germany’s territorial claims to Alsace-Lorraine and an attempt to lay claim to a population that could be counted as French on the basis of its voluntary commitment to the political will of the nation.

The public war between French and Prussian historians during the territorial dispute was as polemical as the diplomatic standoff between politicians. In 1907, more than two decades after Renan’s address at the Sorbonne, Meinecke published a lengthy defense of the Prussian school of history’s belief in a German nation of “language, blood, and soil.” In his Weltbürgerum und Staatsnation (Cosmopolitanism and the Nation-State), Meinecke linked the development of the German nation to the influences of other national personalities. He distinguished between what he saw as the truly cosmopolitan German Weltbürger, or universal citizens, and the overly homogenous German Staatsnation (nation-state).

The distinction between cultural and political nationhood has persisted since Renan’s and Meinecke’s formulations. More recently, in the work of Rogers Brubaker, the model has been applied to differences between citizenship laws in France and Germany. Brubaker has argued that whereas France’s citizenship law of 1889 was based on the law of birth ( jus sanguinis), which corresponds to a civic concept of nationhood, Germany’s 1913 Reich Citizenship Act was based on the law of blood ( jus soli), which constructs nationhood according to ethnicity. However, this divide is less clear-cut when we consider that so-called civic nations also extend quasi-citizenship rights to those with ancestral ties to the nation, as in the case of Britain. Moreover, the requirement of countries like France that immigrants assimilate to the state language often blurs the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism and almost always results in exclusionary policies of immigration and citizenship.

The problem with the ethnic-versus-civic school of nationalism is that it assumes that nationalist actors emphasize either civic or ethnic forms of belonging, when in fact they can and often do invoke both. Nineteenth-century French republicans eradicated non-French languages in their attempts to create a centralized state, and German statesmen deferred to civic principles of territorial unity, rather than ethnic arguments about language and religion, in their creation of a unified state in 1871.

There is now a revisionist trend that supports an ethnic-and-civic model of nationalism. Anthony D. Smith has revisited the writings of late eighteenth-century nationalist thinkers and found there a blend of both neoclassical (civic) and Romantic (ethnic) ideas. One of Smith’s students, Oliver Zimmer, has made perhaps the most important contribution so far to this revisionism. Zimmer argues that nationalist actors use “boundary mechanisms” such as rhetoric, legislation, and the media to delimit and define national identity by drawing on “symbolic resources” such as language, culture, history, and political institutions. Moreover, these mechanisms or discursive practices can be both ethnic and civic, even as they draw on the same resource. For example, the anti-Dreyfusards in France conceived of language in ethnic terms of descent, whereas French revolutionaries a century earlier had seen language as the path toward assimilation in a nation created by political will. Similarly, in Germany, eighteenth-century Romantics believed that national consciousness emerged organically through language, while nineteenth-century liberals claimed that Polish minorities were part of the German state on the basis of their linguistic assimilation to the German language.

This is not to say that civic constructions of national belonging are never chauvinistic, or that ethnic discourses of identity do not have the state and its citizens as the central focus. But the shift toward mutually inclusive forms of nationalism, as the contributions in this encyclopedia also show, demonstrates that nationalism is more than the sum of its parts. Rather, it is the construction of the various parts that defines what nationalism is and how it works in practice.

STATIC VERSUS PROCESS

A process-oriented approach defines nationalism by its practices, rituals, and traditions, as opposed to the more traditional static approach that defines nationalism as a set of ideas. Scholars who emphasized the ideological roots of nationalism, including Hans Kohn (1891–1971) and Carlton Hayes (1882–1964), drew on the earlier neo-Romanticism of scholars like Meinecke and sought to explain retrospectively the path of nations toward either destruction, in the case of Nazi Germany, or liberal democracy, in the case of France, Britain, and the United States. For émigré scholars like the Austrian-born Kohn, America was a haven of freedom that reinforced this ideological dichotomy. Later scholars from the 1960s on emphasized the modern practices and rituals of nationalism and created a new consensus that has
remained largely intact. These scholars, including Eric Hobsbawm, Ernest Gellner, and Benedict Anderson, can be loosely grouped together as constructivists; that is, they all define nationalism and national identities in terms of construction, or invention or imagination, even if they differ on how that process of construction occurs.

The leading proponents of the invented-nation theory, Hobsbawm and Gellner, locate the origins of nationality in the modern era. Hobsbawm argues that a popular national consciousness develops through the invention and appropriation of national traditions, such as uniforms, flag ceremonies, and anthems. For example, when the German gymnastics associations changed their uniform colors from the revolutionary black-red-gold to the imperial black-white-red tricolor during the 1890s, this visual inauguration of a new national tradition in late-Wilhelmine Germany showed more saliency than the public statements by politicians and associational leaders a popular shift from liberal to right-wing expansionist nationalism. Hobsbawm's own recollection of learning Austria's national anthem while attending a Viennese primary school in the 1920s shows how such invented traditions are primarily intended for patriotic indoctrination. The republic's first chancellor and veteran Social Democrat, Karl Renner (1870–1950), wrote the lyrics of the Austrian anthem in 1919, which Hobsbawm describes as a “travelogue” of saccharine geographical descriptions. The anthem later went through a stage of reinvention under the Christian Social Party's efforts to revive imperial sentiment in Austria and was composed to the tune of Joseph Haydn's more familiar Habsburg anthem, “Gott erhalte,” which shared the same melody with Germany's imperial anthem later went through a stage of reinvention in 1929. In the interwar period reveals how political nation-builders engineer collective remembering to institutionalize an “acceptable” past. Beyond the realm of popular and official memory, Gellner links the invention of a national identity to a common language. He points to the Reforma- tion as the birthplace of modern national languages, through which the vernacular became the medium of new elite cultures. Although nationalism was largely secular when it emerged as a political movement in the late eighteenth century, the invention and codification of national languages during the sixteenth century was a precursor for the development of national consciousness in Western Europe and was aided by such industrial advances as mass print production.

Gellner’s interpretation of nationalism as the product of industrialization has been criticized for being reductionist in its emphasis of outcomes over processes. But a more serious flaw in Gellner’s argument, and one that Anglophone historians rarely point out, is his under-
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In response to seemingly endless permutations of Anderson’s famous phrase, some critics have protested that national identity is not an exclusive, or even dominant, category of imagination. These scholars argue that national ideas also contain within them overlapping ideas of political, religious, social, or gender identity. State monuments and war stories contain themes of personal sacrifice, heroism, charity, and political sovereignty in addition to their commemoration of the nation, as in interwar France’s “monuments to the dead” that commemorated republican, pacifist, and religious as well as national themes of sacrifice.

Other critics of Anderson’s work assert that nations cannot be imagined into existence without some form of symbolic continuity with their premodern past. The most prominent exponent of this view is Anthony D. Smith, whose theory of ethno-symbolism holds that nations must have developed enough linguistic and cultural traits to form primordial ethnic clusters, or ethnies, which later could be constructed as the ethnic lineage of nations. He argues that nationalism in the modern period recalls this shared ethnic past by way of memories, myths, traditions, rituals, symbols, and artifacts. Smith is critical of Anderson’s assessment that the origins of nations lie in “print-capitalism,” which did not exist in the early nineteenth-century territories of Serbia or the Ukraine, where communal national movements were created by a handful of intellectuals, literati, and priests. Smith’s concern is that to see nations only as discursive simplifies or ignores cause and effect explanations of how the nation gained its geographical, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic composition.

Another critic of the constructivist school, John Breuilly, sees nationalism as a political doctrine, first and foremost, not an imagined or invented community. He contends in Nationalism and the State (1993) that nationalism is “neither an expression of national identity . . . nor the arbitrary invention of nationalities for political purposes” (p. 63), but rather a set of ideas and strategies made and carried out by nationalists for social and political gain. Breuilly’s criticism of constructivists who focus on cultural and social processes in isolation from the political project of state building is important. Political ideologies are not the product of national identities, but nationalism draws on the popular appeal of those identities as they devise and execute their ideological programs according to perceived social and political needs.

As constructivists have branched out from the early idealism of much scholarship on nationalism, differences remain over how those processes function in society and at the level of politics. But the consensus is that wherever there are nationalists, there will be elements of invention, myth creation, and public and private imagination all going into the mix to nationalize the members of a community framed by both ethnic and civic notions of belonging.

UNIVERSALISM VERSUS EXCEPTIONALISM

The consensus on modernity and nation building overlaps with another consensus on universalist understandings of nationhood. While universalism seems a paradoxical twin with nationalism, it is in fact the universalist claim that certain preconditions are necessary for the creation of inclusive, secular, enlightened, and, above all, Western nations, as we saw in Gellner’s theory, that makes this paradox work. Nations and nationalisms that do not fall into this category, starting with Central and Eastern Europe in the Gellnerian taxonomy, are by default “exceptional.”

One of the first historians to develop this distinction between Eastern exceptionalism and Western universalism was Hans Kohn. His book The Idea of Nationalism, published in 1944, was an innovative attempt to explain why certain forms of nationalism lead to political ideologies and regimes like fascism. He sought to link nationhood with political behavior by arguing that civic nations displayed rational political behavior, while ethnic nations, including Italy and Germany, engaged in irrational political behavior. Kohn’s approach has been favored by a long line of successors, from Gellner, as we have seen above, to more recent scholars, including Liah Greenfeld, Michael Ignatieff, Rogers Brubaker, and Jürgen Habermas, among others.

Specialized research on Central and Eastern European nationalism shows, however, that where there is an absence of institutional traditions of nationhood, national identity instead is defined by cultural attributes and social behavior. The contributions in Ivo Banac and Katherine Verdery’s edited volume, National Character and National Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe (1995), all demonstrate that the intelligentsia consciously sought to construct national identity through cultural, rather than political, traditions. For example, Hungarian folk art mythologized the indigenous peasant culture through such artifacts as shepherds’ carvings and women’s embroidery, while ethnomusicologists, including the composer Béla Bartók, researched and recorded traditional peasant songs to recreate an authentic, autochthonous folk music culture. Czech nationalists in the multiethnic Czechoslovakian state disseminated nationalism through museums, literature, the press, and schools by a form of cultural education similar to consumerism, whereby the intelligentsia “sells” the national idea to the public “consumer,” who then identifies with and participates in national life.

The universalist school of nationalism developed out of the earlier ethnic-versus-civic school of Renan and Meinecke and preceded the process-oriented approach that abandoned the notion that nationalisms are static creations of a handful of intellectuals. But while revisionism of the first two tensions discussed here are now well
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NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY: CULTURAL NATIONALISM

The term “cultural nationalism” refers to movements of group allegiance based on a shared heritage as in language, history, literature, songs, religion, ideology, symbols, land, or monuments. Cultural nationalists emphasize heritage or culture, rather than race or ethnicity or institutions of statehood. To illuminate the current controversies concerning cultural nationalism, this article will proceed in the following sections: “cultural nationalism with or without the nation-state,” “cultural nationalism vs. human rights,” “transformations of nationalism in the modernizing nineteenth century,” “earlier forms of cultural nationalism: languages and religions,” “ties to historic land,” “anti-colonial

established, the revision of the exceptionalist paradigm remains largely unwritten. That is not to say that scholars of Yugoslavia or Soviet Russia or the Arab Peninsula are not making headway down this path, but that the scholarship on these non-Western examples has so far not been integrated within comparative and transnational approaches. Scholars who rejected Kohn’s East–West distinction ground their objections on historical exceptions to the rule, rather than any theoretical reassessment of that divide. Musing from these accounts is a rigorous comparative and transnational model that can account for the high proportion of nationalists borrowing from other forms of nationalism, which would refute the exceptionalist argument.

A revisionist approach to the universalist school would need to examine the contacts and exchanges between different nationalisms; rather than pitting nationalisms against each other as belligerent types that always and everywhere are ideologically opposed—as in fascism, socialism, or liberalism—scholars of nationalism have much work ahead to examine the points of intersection and overlap between competing visions of nationhood. The ethnic-and-civic approaches of recent scholarship, combined with the process-oriented analyses of nationalism, have much to contribute to this revisionism of exceptionalism. Moreover, the shift away from universalist understandings of nationalism and nation building will also dispense with an unhelpful Eurocentrism of exceptionalism. Moreover, the shift away from universalist understandings of nationalism and nation building will also dispense with an unhelpful Eurocentrism of exceptionalism. 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movements for self-rule,” “gender equality and national cultures,” “regionalism, multi-culturalism, and ideological difference as national culture,” and “transnationalism, performance, and cultural tourism today.”

CULTURAL NATIONALISM WITH OR WITHOUT THE NATION-STATE

Friedrich Meinecke in 1908 proposed the distinction between the "Kulturnation (cultural nation)" as expressed in literature and fine arts and the "Staatsnation (political nation)." With some culturally distinctive peoples still longing for a nation-state, President Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points Address” and subsequently the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 legitimized and selectively applied the principle of self-determination of nations. Today the principle is operative in the “United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights” (1944). Kristen Walton (2007) argued that Scottish nationalism began as a medieval political movement, (1944). Benedict Anderson’s influential Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (1983) argued that whether there is a state or not, the national community is to a great extent imagined. Historically, the cultural creation of the nation filled the void left by the break-down of traditional smaller communities. With the aid of vernacular language development that influences a growing number of people through a print culture, an imagined community of the nation appeared. An anthropologist specializing in Indonesia, Anderson focused on the positive sense of belonging and love produced by the group association (Delaney and O’Mahony, pp. 91–92). Anderson’s view furthers Holshawm and Range’s detailed studies of the creation of national historic memory in The Invention of Tradition. Scholars continue to wrestle with Meinecke’s distinction as well as with the issue of whether one can discuss nationalism before the modern period, as in Hans Kohn’s The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background (1944). Kristen Walton (2007) argued that Scottish nationalism began as a medieval political movement, acquired Calvinism as a key trait in sixteenth century, and after the Act of Union of 1707 was limited politically and became cultural nationalism.

CULTURAL NATIONALISM VERSUS HUMAN RIGHTS

From the eighteenth century on, nation-states were thought to have “a culture, defined by language, arts, customs, religion and/or race, that may be enormously varied by region and ethnicity but that generally has a dominant, hegemonic strain adopted by urban elites” (2); thus Vincent Pecora introduces Nations and Identities, a Cultural Studies anthology of key Western texts on nationalism. Reginald Horak showed that in English thought, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century institutional studies of the freedom-loving Anglo-Saxon heritage shifted to a racial emphasis in the 1780s through the influence of Paul-Henri Mallet and John Pinkerton (in Horowitz, 1992, pp. 77–100). In The Science of Culture in Enlightenment Germany (2007), Michael Carhart traced late eighteenth-century scholars seeking the “unique genius of a given nation or locality” and viewing Moses, Homer, and Cicero respectively not as individuals or sages of universal humanity but as national spokesmen of respective of Hebrew, Greek, and Roman national achievement (pp. 6–7). This historicizing viewpoint contrasts with Renaissance humanist eclectic scholarship which sought to gather the seeds of knowledge from the diverse texts of the ancients to enhance one’s human heritage. The classic contrast of Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) with Thomas Paine’s The Rights of Man (1792) epitomizes the rivalry between the particularizing viewpoint of national cultures with the theory of universal human nature, universal natural rights, and contractual government declared in Locke’s Second Discourse of Government (1690), the American colonists’ “Declaration of Independence” (1776), and of the French Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen (1789).

TRANSFORMATIONS OF NATIONALISM IN THE MODERNIZING NINETEENTH CENTURY

George Moise utilized the term “Cultural Nationalism” as a viewpoint glorifying the German Völkl that emerged from Fichte’s 1808 “Addresses to the German Nation” and Friedrich Ludwig Jahn’s 1810 Volkshum. While Fichte emphasized unity and integration of the German people then oppressed by French conquerors, Jahn emphasized keeping the German race pure in preparation for its task of civilizing the world by force. Romanticism gave to this “nationalism” a “spiritual essence” as in “German spirit,” an ethereal concept embodied in poetry and national memories (Moise, pp. 2, 40–44).

For Romans, the Greek statues embodied the perfect beauty of human form, which Winckelman also thought characteristic of Germans and English of his day. The Romantic finding of two distinctive forms of national identity in ancient Greek and ancient Hebrew literature was influential on gaining some international interest in the early nineteenth-century movement of
Greek independence against the Turks and in the later nineteenth- and twentieth-century Zionist movements of Jewish return to the land where Hebrews had ruled in the ancient kingdoms of Israel and Judah.

In the 1830s appeared Baedeker's first guidebooks to the Rhineland which encouraged the middle class to take tours on the new railroads. A German nationalistic culture of display cultivated interest in natural settings, historical ruins, Germanic myths, folk dance and costume in local festivals, and historic memory. The guidebooks contributed to the "nationalization of the masses" as people came to identify with the 1870 creation of the modern German state (Payne, et al. pp. 169–171). Similarly, according to Eugene Weber, it is the nineteenth century, the age of modernization, when the ordinary citizens living in the countryside of France became "French."

In contrast to practical nationalists who negotiated borders and believed in co-existence of nations (in Izhai, Woodrow Wilson, pp. 303–304; Moise narrowly defined "cultural nationalism" as leading to the view of the one true nation's superiority and right to conquer other nations. With Romanticism's revival and with the burgeoning pseudo-science of race in the period of Emperor William II, this type of "cultural nationalism" culminated in twentieth-century totalitarian movements (Moise, pp. 53, 65; Payne, pp. 138–139). Gobineau's *Essay on the Inequality of Races* (1853–1855) with its hierarchy of three races influenced the Social Darwinian interpretations of Darwin's *Origin of Species* (1859). During the late nineteenth-century European imperialist conquests in Africa, explicitly racist cultural nationalism proliferated as in Houston Stewart Chamberlain (Pecora, pp. 20, 200, and Chamberlain's text on "The Nation," 200–204). Lamarckian genetics taught that organisms acquire physical and cultural characteristics as they adapt to environment. While Karl Marx was optimistic in general that racial differences could be overcome, in his personal correspondence his specific comments on Blacks, Jews, and racial differences could be overcome, in his personal correspondence his specific comments on Blacks, Jews, and Slavs vocalized the negative stereotypes of his times (Diene Paul in Horowitz, 1991, pp. 117–140).

**EARLIER FORMS OF CULTURAL NATIONALISM: LANGUAGES AND RELIGIONS**

Back in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, writers in Tuscany in particular were establishing the Italian language, creating a burgeoning Renaissance literature that became the envy of the English and the French. In the early sixteenth century Machiavelli called to the Italian people divided in their regional city-states to throw off the yoke of foreign invading oppression, in particular the French monarchy, the Spanish monarchy, and the Holy Roman Empire. Nineteenth-century theorists of a political state for Italian national unity would cite Machiavelli as a founder of their type of state nationalism.

Luther's call in 1520 to the German nobility to throw off allegiance to the Pope resulted in a weakened Holy Roman Empire which at the close of the Thirty Years War in 1648 housed independent Lutheran, Calvinist, and Catholic rulers of distinctive states. On the principle "Cuius regio, eius religi," the rulers determined the religion of the state. Throughout Europe at large, the Pope was dependent on political leaders such as the monarch of Spain to lead Counter-Reformation wars against regions seceding from the Catholic Church. Thus, even Catholic political leaders were strengthened vis-a-vis the Pope. Thus, in France, even though religious war engulfed the country from the 1560s to 1590s and Calvinists received some legal tolerance (1598–1609), the overall Catholic sentiment of the people and the monarchy was embodied in Gallicanism, celebrating the liberties of the French Catholic Church and viewing the Pope as an Italian prince.

**TIES TO HISTORIC LAND**

A people often builds its sense of identity around association with particular land. In the ambivalence of American national identity, where the destruction of indigenous tribes played so important a role in Manifest Destiny from coast to coast and belied the myth of a "virgin land" awaiting the taking, Amerindian names for historical places are common and some fictional American names continue to romanticize locations. With growing respect for distinctive identity, the Smithsonian Museum has returned artifacts and bones to the heirs of indigenous tribes from whence they were taken.

Delphi, the site of the Oracle of Apollo, helped unify the Greeks divided politically into many city-states. The Delphic oracle sat on top of the Omphalos Stone, believed by the ancient Greeks to be the center of the world, and Greeks arriving to query her on issues of war and peace and received cryptic answers to untangle. The city of Jerusalem was the capital of the ancient Hebrew monarchy under King David around 1000 B.C. It has become contested sacred space among Jews who recall their worship at Solomon's Temple and later at the Second Temple; Christians who recall Jesus's life, death, and resurrection; and Moslems who recall that Prophet Mohammed stopped at the Temple Mount on his ascent to Heaven.

The emergence of detailed maps played a role in the development of personal identification with local territory. For example, John Speed's *Theatre of the Empire of Great Britain,* presenting an exact geography of the kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland… (1611) exhibits maps detailed enough to be later used by soldiers fighting...
in the English Civil War of the 1640s, yet is an almanac of symbols of ethnic groups uniting in a political entity. While the first title page shows twenty-four crests of previous rulers in the territory then in King James I’s dominion, the second title page displays costumed personifications of a Britain formed by a Roman, a Saxon, a Dane, and a Norman.

ANTI-COLONIAL MOVEMENTS FOR SELF-RULE
As French aggressive nationalism accompanied Napoleon’s troops, both cultural and political nationalist movements emerged in many of Napoleon’s puppet regimes in Europe, as well as in Haiti and the Middle East. Likewise, nationalist movements in Latin America in the nineteenth century carved out independent regimes from the former Spanish empire.

Similarly, the internecine warfare of the two world wars decimated Europe and allowed for successful anti-colonial uprisings in the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere. By the 1960s France had lost its control of North Africa, Western and Central Africa, Indochina and many islands. A diversity of people who had served the French colonial governments emigrated to France, increasing the need for a French nationalism that would be multi-cultural. In Africa, new nations often had to struggle with borders carved out by European imperialists, borders that did not accord with ethnic or tribal or regional state identities; a positive resource was Pan-African pride and cooperation. The USSR—despite a constitution which did not accord with ethnic or tribal or regional state identities; a positive resource was Pan-African pride and cooperation. The USSR—despite a constitution which respected national ethnic identities—increased Russian hegemony over a variety of peoples; in the late twentieth century the USSR split into many states, including Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, while Yugoslavia disintegrated into states like Croatia and Serbia, among others, with continuing warfare influenced by religious as well as ethnic hatreds. Ethnic groups reinvigorated their languages, their cultures, their histories, their literature and their music.

GENDER EQUALITY AND NATIONAL CULTURES
The “Beijing Declaration” of 1995 elaborating women’s rights as human rights in celebrating 50th anniversary of the United Nations calls for equal education, equal participation in government, equal employment opportunities, and an end to violence against women. Such goals contend with the gender inequalities in many national, regional, and local cultures. Chandra Talpade Mohanty in Feminism without Borders (2003) defends an “antiracist feminist framework, anchored in decolonization and committed to an anticapitalist critique,” as she works for global political cooperation (p. 5). Via an anthology of documents including manuscripts of women’s letters, autobiographies, and speeches, In Their Own Voice: Women an Irish Nationalism, Margaret Ward relates the roles of women in the successful movement for Irish independence; this women’s history also provides information on women’s daily lives and on their struggle for equality in the home as well as in the state. Poet Eavan Bland struggles with the problem that “Irish poems simplified women most at the point of intersection between womanhood and Irishness” (in Pecora, p. 357).

REGIONALISM, MULTI-CULTURALISM, AND IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE AS NATIONAL CULTURE
The United States is a good example of a nation-state which has experienced several stages of national culture and regional variations. The state history of Massachusetts emphasizes English Calvinist origins and heroic actions leading up to the American Revolution. Through the 1950s American history was written from such an East Coast point of view, emphasizing Anglo-Saxon Protestant male heritage. State histories of California emphasize Spanish Catholic colonial and then Mexican dominion until 1848. In keeping with that heritage, the radical history book Occupied America supports Chicano national culture in the Southwest, and the letter “A” in the popular student college organization MECHA stands for Azatlan, the imagined full extent of the Aztec empire. Today, for teaching students American national heritage, one includes texts concerning men and women from a multiplicity of regions, ethnicities, classes, religions, mixed heritages, and political and social viewpoints; for example, one may step into viewpoints of a medley of Americans via Through Women’s Eyes or explore contemporary American national culture via the electronic Gale Encyclopedia of Multicultural America. A benign form of nationalism found in liberal democracies and not requiring homogeneity in ethnicity has been called “civic nationalism” (in Mortimer, part V).

In the edited Cultural Nationalism in East Asia: Representation and Identity, Harumi Befu assembled scholarship on the continuing transformations in cultural identity after national sovereignty. Prasenjit Duara, discussing the tension between federalism and centrist in China of 1920s and the victory of the centrist position, concludes that the movements for autonomy in Taiwan and Hong Kong reflect continuation of the legitimate alternative federal argument for flowering of regional Chinese identities. In evaluating the contested national symbol of the Great Wall during the Maoist and post-Maoist periods, Arthur Waldron contrasts the Western Enlightenment use of the Wall to symbolize Chinese “Greatness” with traditional Chinese association of the Wall with oppressive government. Michael Robinson
points out the importance of liberating oneself from the master narrative of the history of the nation-state as he explores diverse visions within Chinese, Korean, and Japanese cultural nationalism. As Befu sums up Ann Aana- goot’s analysis of diverse Chinese approaches to nationalism, “the nationalism of a given nation need not be sung in unison, but instead may be polyphonic—contrary to popular belief, which assumes that the nationalism of a given country is one since the nation is culturally homogeneous, whether it be China, Japan, or Korea, and that the ‘correct’ nationalism is that promoted by the state” (Befu, p. 3).

TRANSNATIONALISM, PERFORMANCE, AND CULTURAL TOURISM TODAY

In the twenty-first century there is increased global awareness that peoples of diverse religions, ancestry, national backgrounds need to live together peacefully in multi-cultural states. A diversity of groups may practice minority national cultures (with distinctive language, food, religion, rituals, holidays, as well as political organizing) while living peaceably as citizens within one political entity, and each group may express transnational communal ties within a borderlands or to a far-away ‘homeland.’ Public education attempts to inform the communal ties within a borderlands or to a far-away national culture. Meinecke’s Staatsnation involves the political institutions, laws, naturalization process, and citizenship behavior governing the land, and Meinecke’s Kulturrnation becomes in liberal multi-cultural states a salad-bowl of distinctive and blended cultures celebrating historic and imagined communities.

Cultural nationalism may be viewed as a process to regenerate a people through expansion of its art, its music, its theatre, and its thought to contribute to humanity at large (Rabow-Edling, p. 443). Barbara Kelly (2008) has gathered articles on French music and national identity which reveal the tensions between national and universal expression, and the tensions between French and German identities, especially evident in the borderlands of German-controlled Alsace-Lorraine. Joseph Maguire (2005) analyzed international sports competitions as a major source of identity-formation and pride, as well as entertainment in a global economy. In Staging Nationalism (2005) Kiki Gounaridou has brought together experts on theatre from Japan to Quebec to illustrate how particular productions have either contributed to build or subvert national cultural identity.

Performance in the Deutsche Oper, Berlin, in summer of 2008, of a South African troupe’s 1970s Cape Town setting of Porgy and Bess is an indication of the cultural importance to blacks in post-Apartheid South Africa of the saga of oppression and the determination to overcome impossible odds that marked the Black experience in the American South. A movement of Black pride is a transnational cultural movement that appreciates the diversity of cultural achievements by people with some African ancestry. Afro-American nationalist, as well as militant separatist, works are extensive enough that one can consult the annotated bibliography After-American Nationalism.

Cultural tourism, an aspect of global capitalism that entertains travellers and provides employment for local communities, thrives on appreciation of diverse cultures and encourages re-enactment of traditions of yesteryear. The National Ethnic Minorities Theme Park in Beijing is a celebration of ethnic minority cultures within mainland China through display of costume, ritual, food, dance, and architecture; the show-place for Chinese as well as international tourists highlights the diversity of peoples and nationalities in the People’s Republic of China. The personal greetings, especially by costumed female performers in historic costume, fulfill the urban public’s quest for a connection to a historic past of small communal cultures. Likewise appealing to curiosity for the exotic, the Polynesian Cultural Center in Oahu, Hawaii, is a transnational showplace in which Brigham Young University student re-enacts and entertains visions with the traditional lifestyles of islanders from Fiji, New Zealand, the Marquesas, Samoa, Tahiti, Tonga, and Hawaii. Tourists are encouraged to visit also the adjoining large Mormon Church. This American transnational theme park encourages popularization of the Maori historic memory of migration of Polynesian kin across thousands of miles—a transnational unity—while celebrating the American minority national culture of Pacific Islanders.

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With few exceptions, European colonization was resisted from the beginning of the scramble for Africa.

NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY: AFRICA

Nationalism can be best described as an awakening of a sense of national identity and patriotic loyalty to a country, a nation, or a nation-state. Broadly, African nationalism refers to resistance and protest movements against European colonial rule, leading to demands for independence. Ideologically, African nationalism involved different political, economic, and socio-cultural elements who were bound together by the desire to overthrow European colonial rule in Africa. African nationalism developed in different phases over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Modern African nationalism may be profitably studied under three broad categories that have been identified as micro-nationalism (nineteenth century), mezzo-nationalism (nineteenth-century, twentieth-century), and macro-nationalism (post–World War II).

FIRST PHASE: NINETEENTH-CENTURY MICRO-NATIONALISM

African nationalist sentiment first arose in the period of the European “scramble” and partition of Africa at the close of the nineteenth century. Following the Berlin Conference on Africa (1884–1885), European powers (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Portugal, and Spain) began occupying and restructuring the African continent. The period coincided with the abolition of the trans-Atlantic Slave Trade and the development of commodity trade now required for Europe’s expanding industries. By the end of the nineteenth century, the European powers had divided Africa, and most African nations had lost their sovereignty. European colonization elicited a wide array of responses from Africans.

With few exceptions, European colonization was resisted from the beginning of the scramble for Africa.
Often referred to as traditional nationalism, it was led by the pre-twentieth-century African traditional political elite, who sought to prevent the penetration of European powers into their territories. The resistance movements of this period were expressed both violently and nonviolently or diplomatically. The leaders of these movements challenged the European conquest and sought to prevent the colonization of their societies. In this manner, Africans were expressing a strong sense of nationalism—loyalty to their nations, nation-states, and, sometimes, ethnicities. However, some Africans accepted the Europeans for pragmatic reasons.

Evidence of resistance to European colonization appears throughout Africa's early colonial history. For example, the Ashanti leader Prempeh I (r. 1888–1931) rejected a British offer of protectorate status. Menelik II, emperor of Ethiopia, made it clear in a letter to Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia in 1891 that he would not tolerate the colonization or division of Ethiopia. This vision of cooperation would not last, as evidenced by the bloody Battle of Adwa (1896) with Italy, which Ethiopia won. Other instances of violent resistance to European colonization in Africa include the Ndebele Rebellion against the British in 1896, the Herero Uprising in German South-West Africa (modern Namibia) from 1904 until 1907 and the Maji Maji Rebellion against German policies and occupation in parts of German East Africa (modern Tanzania) in 1905. Yaa Asantewaa (c. 1830–1921), the Asante queen mother, rallied the Asante against the British, when they exiled the Asante king, Prempeh I (1888–1931) to Seychelles in 1896. In 1900, she led a rebellion against the British in what is known as the War of the Golden Stool and the final war in a series of Anglo-Ashanti Wars between the British and the Asante Empire. Although the Asante were defeated and Yaa Asantewaa equally exiled to Seychelles, where she died in 1900, her rebellion highlights the important roles women played in pre-colonial African politics as well as rejection of European colonization by Africa’s indigenous political elite. The aim of African nationalism during this period was primarily to challenge the establishment of European colonial states and to reassert independence for the continent’s various nationalities, kingdoms, and chiefdoms.

The late nineteenth century witnessed the rise of political/pressure groups such as the Aborigines’ Rights Protection Society, which was formed in the 1890s in the Gold Coast. The society focused on advancing the cause of indigenous Africans and ameliorating conditions of economic and political disempowerment that began to threaten the rights of Africans under colonial rule. Taken together, these resistance efforts offer a picture of the extent to which the African continent had been thrown into turmoil as a result of the scramble for Africa, the establishment of colonialism, and the restructuring of African societies to meet the demands of European societies. Although this first stage had largely ended by the first decade of the twentieth century, the political struggle spearheaded by the indigenous elite and other Africans affected by European colonization provided the background for the political struggle of later years.

SECOND PHASE: MEZZO-NATIONALISM

The second phase in African nationalism (1914–1945) began with the establishment of effective colonial administration by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century. This phase of African nationalism, carried out within the framework of the new multination states created by the colonial powers, was a subtler continuation of the earlier resistance movements that had failed to stop the consolidation of colonial rule. For the most part, their nationalist sentiments were expressed in the form of cultural nationalism which sought to assert the integrity and validity of African cultures, language, and religion including Islam and African independent churches that affirmed African values. Cultural nationalist such as Simon Kimbangu (c. 1887–1951) of the Belgium Congo; Nehemiah Tate (c. 1850s–1891) of South Africa; Edward Blyden (1832–1912) of Liberia; and Joseph E. Casley Hayford (1866–1930) a prominent Gold Coast lawyer, relied on African cultural values to articulate nationalist demands and challenge to colonial instruments.

The nationalist movement in this period was also led by Western-educated African intellectuals, such as Jomo Kenyatta (c. 1894–1978, Kenya), Kenneth Kaunda (b. 1924, Zambia), Haile Selassie (1892–1975, Ethiopia), Albert Luthuli (c. 1898–1967, South Africa), and Nnamdi Azikiwe (1904–1996, Nigeria). Their initial objective was the reformation of the colonial system and incorporation of the emerging African elite within the existing colonial political, economic, and social institutions. In the interwar years (1918–1939), African nationalists were emboldened by President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech (1918), which endorsed the right of nations, including subject peoples, to self-determination.

The African intelligentsia also spearheaded the formation of political organizations to push for reforms. In West Africa, the People’s Union was formed in Lagos in 1908 while the Nigeria National Democratic party was formed in 1923. Casely-Hayford organized the National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA) as a platform for the British West African intelligentsia to articulate the aspirations of African and to bring such aspirations before the government. The NCBWA convened its inaugural meeting in Accra, Ghana from March 11 to 29, 1920.
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The political struggles of the 1930s and the early 1940s were influenced by significant changes in the colonial and world economy, among specific internal developments in individual colonies. The Great Depression, when African peasants faced low producer prices and unemployment, the Italo-Ethiopian conflict (1935–1941), and the outbreak of World War II (1939–1945), generated discontent against colonial occupation from peasants and workers.

In the 1930s and the early 1940s, a younger and more vocal and militant elite that demanded significant reforms and some degree of self-rule began to champion the nationalist struggle. Political associations such as the Gold Coast Youth Conference (1930) under the leadership of J. B. Danquah, the West African Youth League (1935) led by J.T.A. Wallace-Johnson, the Nigerian Youth Movement (1934), and the Neo Destour Party (1934) formed by Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia championed African demands. These political organizations took a more militant stance and began the process of mobilizing the African population for political action. In addition, the Italian occupation of Ethiopia (the only free African nation) had a significant psychological impact all over Africa. Africans began to rise not just in protest of their colonization but also in sympathy with Ethiopia. The momentum of the 1930s was sustained by the outbreak of World War II in 1939.

THIRD PHASE: MEGA-NATIONALISM (POST–WORLD WAR II

The third and most significant phase in the development of African nationalism began at the end of World War II in 1945. Across the continent, African communities had mobilized to support the war effort. They contributed financial support both directly and indirectly, supplied soldiers in a variety of capacities, and provided resources, including food, for the troops. Nearly two million Africans were recruited as soldiers, porters, and scouts for the Allies. The war redefined European and African relations in colonial Africa in many ways. Yet these sacrifices did not end when the war ended as African people found themselves in a deep economic depression after the war.

Africans’ demands on the colonial government intensified after World War II. African combatants were emboldened by the demystification and the demythologization of the idea of the white man’s invincibility, yet African soldiers returned home to colonial states that still considered them inferior. Many veterans had expected that their dedication to colonial governments would be recognized and they would be rewarded accordingly. This did not occur, and these soldiers returned to war-ravaged countries severely underserved by a weak global economy. Nationalist movements throughout Africa were energized by this influx of returning soldiers.

The postwar period was also characterized by challenges to superpower hegemony and the profound changes occurring in Latin America and Asia, along with the emergence of new international organizations. The Atlantic Charter (1941) and the anti-colonial stance of the United Nations and the United States helped to fuel nationalist movements. By the late 1940s, nationalist movements became more radical and Africans everywhere began to protest colonial rule.

Pan-Africanism A major factor in the advancement of nationalist movements in Africa was Pan-Africanism. From its roots in early abolitionist movements, Pan-Africanism sought to unite Africans and overcome ethnicnicity by stressing the similarities and connections among all Africans. Pan-Africanism emphasized black pride and African identity and sought to unite Africans with their kin in the diaspora. For members of the African diaspora, Pan-Africanism was a tool to overcome discrimination and oppression, just as it helped Africans on the continent overcome ethnicity and European colonialism. The
two most notable leaders of early Pan-Africanism were Marcus Garvey (1887–1940) who advocated a return to Africa for blacks and W. E. B. DuBois (1868–1963) who emphasized Africa’s glorious past and linked African independence from colonial rule to African-American liberation. African political organizations such as the Aborigines’ Rights Protection Society and the African National Congress, and the National Congress of West Africa drew inspiration from Pan-Africanism. The ideology of négritude, which arose among French-speaking African students in France in the 1930s, espoused ideas similar to those of the early Pan-Africanists. Pan-Africanist ideas which blossomed in the early twentieth century as African societies came under colonial control gained momentum after the 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester, England.

Pan-Africanism was very popular among African elites, most of whom had studied in Europe and the United States. By the 1950s, Pan-Africanism had profoundly influenced leading African nationalists, including its most ardent advocate—Kwame Nkrumah (1900–1972) of Ghana. Others influenced by Pan-Africanism included Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Julius Nyerere (1922–1999) of Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, Albert Luthuli of South Africa, and Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria. Later nationalists such as Nelson Mandela (b. 1918) of South Africa and Robert Mugabe (b. 1924) of Zimbabwe were also influenced by the movement. These men played influential roles in both the Pan-African movement and the nationalist struggles in their respective countries after 1945.

THE PATH TO INDEPENDENCE

The path to independence varied throughout Africa. Egypt was the first country to gain political independence in 1922 following the nationalist struggle under the Wafd Party under Zaghalal Pasha in 1918. Although politically independent, Egypt remained under the political influence of Britain until the revival of Egyptian nationalism in the 1940s. The eventual emergence of the young militant nationalist, Colonel Gamal Nasser (1918–1970) as ruler of Egypt in 1954 after a military coup. Although Britain, France, the United States, and the new state of Israel threatened Egyptian independence, Nasser survived by becoming an ally of the Soviet Union.

Nationalism in North Africa was affected by a new world order at the end of World War II. As a former Italian colony, Libya became a UN trusteeship under British control. Britain granted Libya independence in 1951 under King Idris (1890–1983), a less than satisfactory outcome for young Libyan nationalists. Young nationalists took over power in a military coup in 1969 under Colonel Mu’ammar al-Qaddafi (b. 1942). The path to independence in the rest of the Maghrib was affected by the nature of French colonial ideology of assimilation and association. The nationalist movement in Morocco and Tunisia where the French established protectorate systems of administration were influenced by a strong Muslim tradition and the existence of a long tradition of political agitation. Algerian nationalists faced a more difficult situation. French Algeria was a colony administered as a part of France. As such, Algeria was engaged in a bloody armed struggle led by the National Liberation Front or Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). The FLN established military posts throughout Algeria and carried out guerilla attacks. By 1958 it had become clear that Algerians would settle for nothing short of independence.

West African colonies had a more or less peaceful process of transition to independence following the adoption of a series of constitutions that culminated in the liberation of many West African countries beginning with Ghana in 1957. In Ghana, the struggle for independence was led by the conservative United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) formed in 1944 by J. B. Danquah (1895–1965). The UGCC was displaced by the more radical and populist Convention People’s Party (CPP) under the leadership of the charismatic Kwame Nkrumah. Its broad social ideology appealed to the masses and strengthened the party’s challenge of British colonial authority. Nigeria’s independence followed in 1960 through the efforts of Nnamdi Azikiwe and the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) among other groups. The path to independence in French West Africa was also influenced by the French policy of assimilation and the French view that the colonies were an extension of France overseas. Still some Africans who did not subscribe to this ideology organized political movements. The Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), formed in 1946, championed agitation for independence in French West and Equatorial Africa. The RDA struggle forced General Charles de Gaulle to offer a compromise, which gave French western and Equatorial African colonies the option of forming a French Community under which France’s twelve colonies would be given self-government and control over local affairs while France controlled finance, defense, and foreign affairs. All the colonies except Guinea chose this option.

In east, southern, and central Africa, African nationalism was affected by the presence of Europeans and Asian settlers. In most of these territories, the struggle involved peasants whose access to land and other economic opportunities had been restricted by white minorities as was the case in Kenya, Rhodesia, and South Africa. While most of Africa had gained independence by the 1960s, the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola and the white settler colonies of Zimbabwe...
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and South Africa continued the struggle, taking such extreme measures as waging guerrilla warfare into the 1980s and 1990s before independence was won.

CONCLUSION

Overall, African nationalism developed as a reaction to colonial rule with the goal of achieving independence for the nation-states created under colonialism. Led mostly by Western-educated African elites, African nationalisms led to the achievement of political independence by forty African countries by the late 1980s. Yet, independence may have been difficult to achieve without the efforts of other groups such as peasant men and women, workers, and traders. African women contributed extensively to resistance efforts and nationalist movements in different parts of Africa. Like their male counterparts, African women responded to their harsh situation under colonial rule by organizing protests, boycotts, workers' strikes, and demonstrations.

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NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY: ASIA

In Asia, as elsewhere, nationalism has been used to mobilize support for the creation of new nation-states or the reinvigoration of existing ones. It has also been activated for such goals as national self-determination, social and economic development, the defense of territorial integrity or territorial expansion, and domination over other nations. Like other nationalisms, Asian nationalisms have deployed historical memories and myths, belief in a shared ethnicity, links to a territorial homeland, and shared cultural characteristics such as language, literature, religion, and customs to create a sense of common identity, purpose, and responsibility.

The diversity of Asia in terms of geography, culture, religion, and ethnicity is such that in many contexts the adjective Asian has little meaning. However, Asian nationalisms do have one important common feature: they developed largely in response to Western invasion or intrusion. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Western powers increasingly competed for power and influence in Asia. India, Burma, and Malaya were British colonies; the East Indies were under the Dutch; while the French colonized Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, collectively known as Indochina. The United States occupied the Philippines and used military force to open Japan to foreign trade. China escaped outright colonization but was forced to open more than one hundred ports to trade and to allow foreign settlements and concessions on Chinese territory that were, in effect, mini colonies. Foreign troops protected foreign interests, and foreign gunboats patrolled Chinese rivers. The Japanese occupation of much of East and Southeast Asia in the 1930s and the 1940s accelerated the growth of nationalism in the affected nations.

Nationalism developed earlier and faster in some Asian countries than in others. It took quite varied forms: in Japan and Thailand it was based on loyalty to a sovereign and the revival of traditional religion; in China it was strongly linked to support for a republic, to the restoration of national sovereignty, and eventually to support for the Communist Party; and in India nationalism was based on self-rule and the ideal of a secular democracy. However, everywhere in Asia, nationalism was a reaction to foreign imperialism or colonialism, and it grew out of a fear of the great powers and a determination to strengthen the nation.

Elites played an important part in the development of nationalism. Traditional ruling elites felt vulnerable to the advance of Western imperialism. Although they sometimes reached accommodation with colonial regimes, they also supported nationalist movements in some cases. Even more important were the new elites. The growth of trade, especially in great trading cities such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, Singapore, Bombay (Mumbai), and Calcutta (Kolkata), produced the development of the middle classes that became involved in commerce, administration, and education. These new social groups often worked in close contact with Westerners, sent their children to schools that pursued modern curricula, and read modern-style newspapers. They were conscious of national humiliations but also of what they saw as their country’s backwardness of their countries. They perceived reform and modernization as essential for national survival.
Many of them joined nationalist movements, which in countries such as Vietnam, Malaya, and Indonesia also involved active anticolonialist struggles.

Asian nationalist leaders promised not only that their nations would become stronger but also that they would make economic progress, become wealthier, and allow their peoples to escape poverty once they could control their own future. These promises undoubtedly gained them much support during independence struggles. After independence, such promises have only been partially realized, although starting from the 1960s, the “East Asian economic miracle” raised the gross national product (GNP) per capita and living standards in Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. The economies of other Asian countries, including China and India, entered a period of rapid growth in the last two decades of the twentieth century. Contemporary Asian nationalisms often derive support from economic success.

Asian nationalist movements felt the opposing pulls of modernization and tradition. They developed in order to defend their nations against foreign pressure or colonization. As these nations were defined in relation to a shared language, tradition, custom, or culture, nationalist movements needed to cultivate a sense of pride in national history and culture. Yet often they were led by members of new elites whose Westernized education and urban lifestyles had cut them off from many aspects of their own culture and tradition or predisposed them to reject or despise it.

The discourse of nationalism might venerate certain social customs while it condemned others as backward, unscientific, or unhygienic. Clothing could be a divisive issue. Mohandas Gandhi (1869–1948), for example, favored the traditional dhoti made of homespun cloth, while most male Congress Party leaders wore a tailored suit, in later decades with a Nehru collar. The nationalist Meiji Restoration in Japan introduced a Westernized educational curriculum, modernized the army and put it into Prussian-style uniforms, and introduced formal Western dress at the imperial court. Yet Japan revived and invented Shinto traditions to provide the new state with legitimizing rites and appealed to the “traditional virtues” of filiality, hard work, and loyalty to the emperor in its depiction of the ideal citizen. In China, the rejection of the traditional family system and the theory that the Chinese nation had been weakened by depriving women of education, created space for feminist action within the nationalist project. However, the New Life movement, introduced in China by the Guomindang government in the 1930s with its emphasis on chastity, modesty, and traditional gender roles, moved in the opposite direction, as did the “virtuous mother, good wife” campaign of the 1980s in post-Mao China.

Language was often an issue. Although nationalists usually promoted local languages in place of colonial ones, their education could mean that they themselves had a better mastery of the colonial language than any local language. For example, the Chinese nationalist leader Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), a Cantonese graduate of the Hong Kong Medical College, spoke English better than he spoke standard Chinese. The same was true of his wife, Song Qingling (1893–1981), later vice chair of the People’s Republic of China. In India, as in other British colonies, nationalism drew on an English-language literature on liberalism and democracy. However, Gandhi increasingly felt that the elite’s use of English cut them off from the masses and advocated a switch to Hindi. Others in the Congress Party saw the use of English as a unifying practice in a multilingual country.

The greatest problem for Asian nationalisms, as for nationalism elsewhere, has been that of ethnic, religious, and language divides. How can a sense of common identity and unity be achieved in a country as ethnically diverse as, say, India or Indonesia? How can nationalism assist the nation-state to address the deep fissures, such as those between Hindus and Muslims in India, or Singhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka? How can nation-states that have propagated ethno- and linguistic nationalism, such as Malaya or Vietnam, accord fair and equal treatment to their substantial ethnic minorities? The problems are exacerbated by the complex history of national borders in Asia. Some predate the emergence of the nation-state, while others were drawn up in the colonial era or at the time of independence. Rarely do they provide an exact match with ethnic divides. Each nation has sought its own solution.

Indonesian nationalism developed unity in relation to external enemies—the Dutch and the Japanese in the anticolonial struggle and the Federation of Malaysia in the 1960s. It also exploited hostility to the Indonesian Chinese minority, who, despite a degree of assimilation, are not regarded by the indigenous people as a part of the national community. Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor in 1975 became a subject of international embarrassment for Indonesia and yet was difficult for Jakarta to negotiate its way out of because it had become inscribed in Suharto-era nationalism. The threat of an external enemy has helped to maintain national unity in India and Pakistan and in North and South Korea, while religion has been significant in Pakistan. China and Vietnam have used ideology, and many nations, including China, Vietnam, and India, have relied on the cult of charismatic leaders. Multilingual countries have attempted to promote national languages: Bahasa Indonesia in Indonesia, Urdu in Pakistan, and standardized Chinese in China. In most of Asia, the state has attempted to maintain a close control over education in order to

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ensure that the curriculum supports nation-building and the discourse of nationalism.

As this general discussion has shown, all Asian nationalist movements encountered these problems of national culture versus Westernization, of tradition versus modernization, and of building a common national identity in a population that may be more or less diverse. The case studies below will illuminate some particular instances of these problems and the different ways they have been resolved.

Japanese Nationalism and Expansionism

Japan's reaction to the challenge of Western expansionism was a modernization project—often referred to as the Meiji Restoration (1868)—designed to make the country catch up with the West. The promotion of industry, the creation of a modern army under central control, and the development of universal education were key measures taken by the Meiji government. The focus of national loyalty for the Meiji citizen, the parliament, and the army was the restored Meiji emperor. The myth of the divine descent of the imperial family and Shintō—its religious rituals reshaped for contemporary needs—were promoted by the state to strengthen the spiritual authority of the emperor. The new mass education system taught children that the Japanese people belonged to one family, all descended from the same ancestor. Yet the new nation-state was otherwise based on a quasi-Western system of government and administration created by economic, political, and social reforms. The ideology of nationalism was used to demand effort, commitment, and sacrifice from all Japanese.

The desire to compete in power and influence with the Western powers and to control the raw materials needed for its industrial effort led to an expansionist tendency in Japanese nationalism. From the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) onward, Japan strove steadily to extend its economic and political influence in China. The Japanese desire to expand its economic empire, reinforced by the 1930s depression, resulted in Japan's World War II (1939–1945) creation of a vast but short-lived economic empire stretching from northeast China to the Dutch East Indies and including all the former European colonies of East and Southeast Asia.

Japanese nationalism was rocked by unconditional surrender at the end of World War II, the emperor's renunciation of his divine status, and the policies designed by the occupation authorities to prevent a revival of nationalist militarism. Contemporary Japanese nationalism is restrained and introverted compared to past standards. However, Japan's wartime record remains a flashpoint. Official visits by government leaders to Shinto shrines commemorating the war dead spark controversy both within Japan and abroad, while the governments of China and South Korea have repeatedly criticized the textbooks used in Japanese schools on the grounds that they whitewash Japan's wartime record of aggression and atrocities.

Chinese Nationalism and Revolution

Nationalism in China was a response to the humiliations suffered at the hands of foreign imperialists. In the nineteenth century, China lost wars with Britain, Russia, France, and Japan, and in addition to these countries, fourteen other countries, including the United States, seized the chance to force concessions from China. Thinkers such as Liang Qichao (1873–1929), often influenced by modern learning that they encountered through study in Japan, began to analyze China's problems in the context of the modern world and urged the transfer of loyalty from the ruler to the nation. Nationalism inspired revolutionary societies such as Huang Xing (1874–1916) and Sun Yat-sen, who overthrew the Manchu (Qing) dynasty (1644–1912) and set up the Republic of China. Both the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist leaders were profoundly influenced by nationalism. It helped the Guomindang rally support for its national government in 1928, and inspired resistance during the Japanese occupation. The Communist Party's record of active and successful resistance to the Japanese gave it nationalist appeal and assisted its rise to power in 1949.

Both the Guomindang and the Communist Party sought to legitimize their rule by promoting identity between the nation and the party-state. The Communist Party invoked the need for national construction as often as socialist construction in appeals for effort and sacrifice. Since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the decline of socialist ideology has led the party-state to rely even more heavily on nationalism.

Nationalist thought in China has often been divided between a pride in China's past civilization and the rejection of customs and ways of living perceived as backward. Advocates of change found ideological and cultural expression in the iconoclastic May Fourth movement of 1920s. Its adherents were extremely open to ideas from the outside, rejected Confucianism, and developed a new written language based on the vernacular and a literature, theatre, and cinema concerned with social problems and patriotism. Many Chinese, while averredly embracing Marxism, was largely hostile to Western influence. Its attitude to China's heritage was also ambivalent, and China's glories were sometimes attacked as the products of a feudal society. Still, except during the Cultural
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Revolution era, resources were devoted to the conservation of palaces, temples, and artifacts, and they were presented as a source of national pride. Post-Mao China has even rehabilitated Confucianism, out of favor with nationalists since the early twentieth century, as a core national value, apparently in the belief that it will strengthen social discipline and a sense of national heritage.

Ethnicity has been an issue for Chinese nationalism. Over 90 percent of China’s population is ethnically Han, but there are many other minority ethnic groups. Ideas of racial hierarchy derived from social Darwinism nurtured Chinese nationalism, which tended to identify nation with race and to represent the ethnically Manchu imperial dynasty as a racially inferior group that had enslaved the Han and sold the country out to Westerners. Sun Yat-sen, a founding father of Chinese nationalism, spoke of driving out the “barbarian Manchus,” but later developed a more inclusive nationalist ideology based on a symbolic alliance of “the five races: Han, Mongol, Manchu, Tibetan, and Muslim.”

Ethnicity remains a problem, especially when combined with problems of national territory. The Chinese empire reached its zenith under the Manchu dynasty, when Tibet, Mongolia, and the Central Asian area that is today called Xinjiang were incorporated into its territory. China also claimed suzerainty over Korea and Annam (northern Vietnam). Successive Chinese governments accepted the loss of control over Korea, Annam, and the territory that now constitutes the Mongolian Republic. However, Beijing regards Tibet and Xinjiang, the homeland of the Uighurs and other Muslim minorities in the northwest, as part of China. Its offer of very limited autonomy to ethnic minorities in these territories has not prevented the growth of secessionist movements. Tibetan and Uighur nationalisms base their appeal on religious, linguistic, and cultural distinctiveness and, increasingly, on fear of the effects of Han in-migration. The international dimensions of both problems also pose difficulties for Beijing. The success of the Tibetan independence movement in exile in drawing attention to its cause makes Tibet a constant irritant in China’s international relations. Xinjiang in China’s far northwest shares borders with five Muslim-majority countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—and is home to over eight million practicing Muslims. There are more than 9.2 million ethnic Uighurs (according to a 2005 sample census) and several other smaller Muslim ethnic groups. Ethnic and religious tensions have fed into Uighur nationalism and encouraged a secessionist movement. Hardly surprisingly, the Chinese government is fearful of the influence of militant Islam from beyond its borders.

NATIONALISM AND THE COLONIAL TRANSITION IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

In 1947, British India—a complex of areas under direct colonial rule and princely states under the British crown—gave way to the independent states of India and Pakistan. Indian national consciousness, on which the independence movement was based, first developed among the educated middle classes of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras (Chennai). The divide between Hindus and Muslims, reflected not only in religious belief but in culture and education, was a problem that became more serious within the nationalist movement over time. The Congress Party, which projected itself as the sole all-India nationalist movement, had some Muslim support; indeed, Muhammed Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), the future Muslim League leader and founder of Pakistan, was a member from 1896 to 1920, but its leadership was overwhelmingly Hindu.

From 1930, when the Congress Party adopted the demand for independence, politically conscious Muslims began to consider what their place as a minority would be in a unified independent India. Disagreements between the Congress Party and the Muslim League over the constitutional measures appropriate to protect what would be a Muslim minority in independent India led to communal tensions, terrible communal violence, and ultimately to the partition of British India, from which arose the Republic of India and a Pakistan embracing the territories of West and East Pakistan (geographically separated by more than one thousand miles). Rooting and civil war led to huge population transfers as Muslims crossed into Pakistan and Hindus and Sikhs into India. Pakistan emerged as an overwhelmingly Muslim state. This remains the case to the present day. In 2007 Muslims made up 96 percent of the population of Pakistan and numbered nearly 170 million. India, by contrast, has retained a considerable Muslim population. It numbered 138 million in 2001 and made up over 13 percent of India’s total population. India also has significant Sikh and Christian minorities.

Nehru, India’s post-independence leader, mobilized Gandhi’s prestige and his transcendental vision of an independent India to fight the religious definition of nationhood favored by the right wing of the Congress Party. He encouraged academics to produce a secularist history of India for use in the schools and promoted the celebration of a diversity of cultures within a single secular state. However, suspicion of Muslims (and later of Sikhs and the marginalization of both communities) has at times undermined the idea of religion as irrelevant to Indian nationhood. The ideal of secularism came under strain during the rule of Indira Gandhi (1917–1984) and her successors. 

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son Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991) in the 1980s and suffered further as the Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party assumed prominence in the 1990s. In its suppression of Naga and Mizo nationalism, of the Khalistan movement in the Punjab, and of Kashmiri unrest, the Indian state has shown a consistent determination to resist any threat to its stability or its territorial integrity.

Despite a shared religion, the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic differences eventually resulted in the breakup of the new state of Pakistan. East Pakistan became Bangladesh in 1971. This separation was accepted remarkably quickly. By contrast, Pakistan continues to forgo its national identity in large part on the basis of rivalry with India. The two countries have fought three wars since independence and remain in dispute over Kashmir.

Pakistan has four major ethnic groups—Balochis, Pujabis, Pashtuns, and Sindhis—and many minor ones. Its linguistic diversity mirrors its ethnic diversity. The national language, Urdu, was spoken as a first language by only 8 percent of the population, most of whom were refugees from India. Urdu was chosen as the national language over Punjabi and Saraiki, mutually intelligible languages spoken by 58 percent of the population, because it had high cultural prestige, a rich literary heritage, and no particular provincial base. English remains the official language of Pakistan, creating a gulf between the ruling national government and the ordinary people.

CONCLUSION
The defeat of Japan in World War II resulted in its withdrawal from China, including Taiwan, from Korea, and from the huge territories it had occupied in Southeast Asia stretching from Vietnam to the Indonesian Archipelago. The withdrawal of the European colonial powers from Asia soon followed, leaving nationalist parties in power in most Asian states. The borders of these states rarely matched ethnic divisions, and most of the new states were ethnically, culturally, and linguistically diverse. Most have nonetheless succeeded in attaining some medium-term stability by building an overarching political culture expressed in the state, by appealing for unity against external or internal enemies, by controlling and shaping education in the service of nation-building, and by promising and in many cases achieving economic growth and improved living standards.

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Although Europe was the cradle of modern nationalism, many believed that nationalism was on the wane on the continent in the aftermath of World War II (1939–1945). The horrors of the war strongly indicated the need for supranationality and ideologies of community that were not based on ethnic allegiances and images of foreigners as enemies. The spread of Communist rule in Eastern and Central Europe after 1945 was seen by many as proof that nationalism could be superseded by more “advanced” ideologies. In Western Europe, the establishment in 1957 of the European Economic Community (later the European Union) was similarly seen as a clear sign that emergent supranationality would gradually replace older, often ethnically based, national identities.

A series of events and political developments toward the end of the twentieth century would dispute these assumptions, at least temporarily. A new academic literature on nationalism flourished from the 1980s (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983; Hobshawn 1990; and many others), and courses on nationalism were introduced at universities all over the continent.

NEW NATIONALISM OR OLD?
The resurgence of nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe cannot be considered in isolation from the
minorities of the Baltic states of Latvia and Estonia have human rights organizations, and the Russian-speaking Roma (gypsy) minorities in Slovakia, Hungary, and elsewhere have repeatedly been criticized by international human rights organizations. These groups take pains to present the nation as a unique and exotic place, different from anywhere else and therefore lacked the cultural recognition often accorded to similar minorities in Western Europe.

Whether the sentiments exploited during the civil wars of Yugoslavia and in post-Communist politics elsewhere could draw on old nationalist ideologies, or whether they were, on the contrary, the expression of a modern ideology pretending to have ancient roots, cannot be answered decisively. Contemporary national identities are fundamentally modern and connected to the modern state, but they draw on a collective sense of belonging and shared identity that in many cases is very old (Smith 1991). It is an empirical question when these identities become urgently relevant at the expense of other identities (such as those associated with class, gender, place, and so on).

**NATIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION**

Like the eastern part of the continent, Western Europe saw a resurgence of nationalist sentiment, politics, and movements toward the end of the twentieth century, and the trend continues in the twenty-first century. Three factors can be invoked to explain this.

First, globalization—the growth of transnational connections due to technological and economic changes—has created a widespread sense of vulnerability with respect to old, rooted cultural traditions and national sovereignty. Some aspects of national cultures have changed very fast, while other aspects have come to be seen as obsolete, and as a result of increased global connectedness, the boundaries of national identity have in many cases become negotiable (Eriksen 2007).

Second, the influx of non-European immigrants into Western Europe, has increased markedly in the last few decades, stimulating a range of debates about national identities, values, the possibilities of integration, the social role of religion, and so on. In the process, it often became clear that there rarely existed unequivocal, widely shared notions of the nature of nationhood.

Third, increased European integration via the European Union has led to a new awareness of national identity as people face standardization and higher-level integration into an ever-stronger European identity formation. This heightened national awareness may take several forms. One form is the symbolic, whereby, for example, national foods, folk dress, or popular culture are invested with importance as a way of counteracting the presumably homogenizing forces of globalization. Heightened national awareness may also take commercial form, whereby tourist boards, local administrations, and other groups take pains to present the nation as a unique and exotic place, different from anywhere else and therefore

**Contemporary Central and Eastern European nationalism tend to have a strong ethnic element, witnessed perhaps most clearly in practices toward ethnic minorities.** For example, exclusionist practices toward Roma (gypsy) minorities in Slovakia, Hungary, and elsewhere have repeatedly been criticized by international human rights organizations, and the Russian-speaking minorities of the Baltic states of Latvia and Estonia have
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worth visiting. The third, and most consequential, form of contemporary European nationalism is political, which is, in a strict sense, the only expression of national sentiment that is properly nationalist, nationalism being primarily a political ideology.

Political nationalism in Western Europe tends to be associated with the “New Right,” that is, the parties that openly defend an ethno-cultural model of the nation and therefore wish to reduce immigration substantially and force immigrants to adapt their customs to those of the majority. In Denmark, Austria, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands, in particular, New Right parties have been successful at elections, but such parties are present and sometimes influential in other countries as well, as in France with its Front National.

However, contemporary political nationalism can also be seen as a wider phenomenon, namely, as the project of securing national autonomy and self-determination in a situation of intensified globalization and transnationalization. Seen in this way, most, if not all, contemporary Western European political parties are forced to relate to nationalist projects, since they have to specify the relationship between national sovereignty and supranational forces and organizations.

THE MUSLIM AS “THE OTHER”

Since the closing years of the twentieth century, public debates about national identity in European countries have increasingly centered on the relationship of European identities to Islam. This development has several causes. First, the growing number of Muslim immigrants (and their descendants) in Western European countries implies closer relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims. Second, a series of confrontations between self-professed representatives of Islam and the West has heightened the sense of tension among both Muslims and non-Muslims. Terrorist attacks on Western targets have played an important part here, the most dramatic event being al-Qaeda’s attacks on targets in the United States on September 11, 2001, but the significance of Israeli attacks on Palestinian settlements should not be underestimated as a source of resentment among Muslims worldwide. Third, identity politics has increased in importance globally, and for many Muslims, the typical form of identity politics has been neither nationalist nor ethnic, but religious.

An influential theory seeking to explain conflicts in the contemporary world was set forth by Samuel Huntington in his 1996 analysis of “the clash of civilizations.” According to Huntington, future geopolitical conflicts will not be fought along ideological lines, but rather along cultural lines, the main conflict areas being near or at the “fault lines” between the world’s civilizations. One of the main fault lines in Huntington’s model is the line assumed to exist between Western Christianity and Islam.

Although Huntington’s theory has been criticized both on conceptual and empirical grounds, it is by and large credible in pointing out the significance of collective identity, or culture, in contemporary politics. Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in debates over national and European identity in European countries. Turkey, a largely Muslim country with a secular constitution, has made efforts to become a member of the European Union since 1987, and it is widely believed that its lack of success is partly to be explained by religion. Although many Europeans today do not practice Christianity—many are atheists or hold heterodox religious beliefs—the symbolic link between Europeanness and Christianity remains strong, and Europe continues, by and large, to identify itself as a Christian continent.

In arguing that Islam is inimical to European national identities, writers and politicians in several countries have maintained that the Islamic societal model is incompatible with democracy, various civil rights, and the freedom of women. The problems of integration associated with some (but not all) Muslims in Europe can be traced to the fact that sharia (Islamic law) is both a legal system and an integral part of the religion, and that Islam is thus an antinationalist religion, placing religious identity before national identity. As a response to these and other accusations, Muslim intellectuals such as Tariq Ramadan (2005) have proposed reforms within Islam, aiming to make it compatible with European societal models and especially the liberal values that are foundational to European democracies. It nevertheless remains to be seen whether, in the future, Muslims will be considered full members of European nations (with the exceptions, of course, of largely Muslim countries like Bosnia and Albania).

NATIONALIST OPTIONS

The centrifugal forces of nationalist, regionalist, and ethnic consolidation continuously counteract the centrifugal forces of the European Union. Since the European Union constitutes an ambiguous political entity—it is neither state, nor federation, nor confederation, but has clear elements of all three—its member countries, as well as regions within (or crossing boundaries between) countries, have chosen different approaches in relating their collective identities to that of the European Union. Because the European Union is the continent’s main gravitational force, it influences political processes in member states as well.

One alternative is that chosen in Spanish Catalonia, which has a distinctive linguistic and ethnic identity that stands in contrast to the majority Castilian identity in
Yugoslavs lived with mixed identities because they were mon term for describing nationalist activities during mixture of extermination and expulsion) became a com- with others. Thus, the concept of “ethnic cleansing” (a with foreign countries often supporting different parties during the armed conflicts. The complexities of the Yugoslav situation highlight the difficulties of national-ism in general. Ethnic nationalism is rarely an easy questions regarding the role of Scotland within the United Kingdom have regularly been raised. The Scottish Nation-alist Party, which favors full independence on nationalist grounds, received about a third of the votes in the Scottish parliamentary elections in 2007. Other Scottish parties argue that Scottish nationhood is possible within the United Kingdom, and beyond that the European Union, thus arguing along lines similar to the Catalans. Significantly, no member state in the European Union has so far split apart. The new nations of Europe all came into being after the collapse of the Soviet empire and its satellite states. Czechoslovakia was peacefully divided into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993 for nationalist reasons (Slovaks being a distinct ethnic group, or nation, although closely related to the Czechs), and the breakup of Yugoslavia cannot be understood independently of the reemergence of politicized nationalism in the region. Following the secession of Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia in 1991, multiethnic Bosnia-Hercegovina opted out and was plunged into a civil war (1993–1995). In Kosovo, a region largely inhabited by ethnic Albanians but symbolically important in Serbian ethnic identity, civil war raged from 1996 to 1999, eventually leading to a fragile independence pre-sided over by the United Nations, interspersed with violent incidents, before full independence from Serbia was achieved in 2008. Finally, the tiny republic of Montenegro, whose inhabitants are culturally and linguisti-cally close to the Serbians (unlike the Kosovars) declared its independence in 2006. The breakup of Yugoslavia was violent and painful, with foreign countries often supporting different parties during the armed conflicts. The complexities of the Yugoslav situation highlight the difficulties of national-ism in general. Ethnic nationalism is rarely an easy option, since most ethnic groups share their territory with others. Thus, the concept of “ethnic cleansing” (a mixture of extermination and expulsion) became a com-mon term for describing nationalist activities during Yugoslavia’s bloody breakup period. Moreover, many Yugoslavs lived with mixed identities because they were of mixed (e.g., Macedonian-Serbian) origin, which sud-denly became illegitimate and “impure.” The ethno-nationalist map did not fit the territory, which was far less clear-cut than one might have expected. Scottish nationalists opting for full independence would come up against similar problems if they were to base Scottishness on an ethnic identity. First, it would be difficult to determine who was a “real” Scot, because many, if not most, Scots (like other Europeans) have mixed origins. Second, Scotland is not inhabited by Scots alone, but also by English, Irish, and substantial numbers of more recent immigrants. Thus, a successful Scottish nationalism would have to be based on criteria other than origins. **EUROPEAN MODELS OF THE NATION, PLUS ALTERNATIVES** In theories of nationalism, it is customary to distinguish between two main forms (although many typologies include five or six): ethnic nationalism based on kinship, origin, and jus sanguinis (the law of the blood); and civic nationalism based on shared territory and jus soli (the law of the soil). Current controversies over the nature of European nations expose the tension between these two principles, which are nevertheless often mixed in practice. An intermediate form of nationalism could be a linguistic nationalism that emphasizes shared culture (through language) but allows foreigners to enter the nation, provided they learn the local language.

There are alternatives to the classic forms of national-ism. As mentioned above, some nations thrive without a state (but with regional autonomy), while others negotiate their future amid transnational turmoil, migration, and a range of foreign cultural influences. A pan-European iden-tity has been posited as an alternative to the parochial and potentially divisive national identities, an approach most poignantly articulated in the Treaty of Maastricht (signed in 1992), but this alternative has failed to gain the tangible support of most Europeans. Europeans today relate emo-tionally to their national football teams, contemporary places, and historical sites in their countries, their language and arts, their myths, and their flags. No supranational identity, European or otherwise, has so far proved capable of trumping these identities for the majority of Europeans. The relevant challenge in the near future consists not, therefore, in dismantling national identities, but rather in balancing national cohesion with an openness to the world, both in the sense of international cooperation and interac-tion, and in the sense of allowing newcomers into the nation as full members.

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NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY: LATIN AMERICA

Race and ethnicity are categories that have been fundamental to the processes of state formation and national identity in Latin America. The idea of mestizaje—the positive conceptualization of interracial mixtures and cultural fusions—has generally anchored Latin American nationalist thought and distinguished it from nationalist developments in other parts of the Western world. Mestizaje has served as both an elite racial ideology and a popular cultural narrative with ambiguous social impacts. On the one hand, mestizaje has glorified miscegenation as a democratizing process that has produced racial harmony. On the other hand, mestizaje has also served as a rhetorical tool that elevates the whitening ideal and obscures racist practices. In effect, tensions between sameness and difference and equality and hierarchy have marked the development of mestizaje in Latin America. Tracing the links between racial thought and nationalism through three distinct historical periods reflects how local, national, and transnational contexts, as well as various historical actors, have shaped continuities and changes in the discourses and practices of ethnic nationalism through time.

INDEPENDENCE AND ETHNO-RACIAL EXCLUSION

Latin American struggles for independence in the nineteenth century featured attempts by liberal patriots to unravel three hundred years of colonial rule by Iberian powers. The challenge included the need to create citizens out of colonial subjects and national identities from fragmented, hierarchical colonial societies. In most cases, the push for independence came from native-born Spaniards, called Creoles to distinguish them from the Iberian-born Peninsulars. By the late 1700s, Creole resentment of the Peninsulars’ privileged access to power and wealth constituted an intra-elite colonial conflict. However, the majority population had little stake in Creole-Peninsular tensions since the colonial caste system, premised upon the construction of ethno-racial categories, promoted white superiority and excluded peoples of indigenous, African, and mixed descent.

Despite the increasing tensions between the Spanish Crown, Creoles, and Peninsulars, colonial elites shared an interest in preventing popular insurgency. The emergence of popular rebellions in the late colonial period reflected precursors to independence, as well as alternative political visions of subordinated groups. Most notably, the Tupac Amaru II Rebellion from 1780 to 1783 in the Andes commemorated Tupac Amaru I, an Inca resistance leader in the conquest period, and called for an alliance among Creoles, mestizos, and indigenous people against the Peninsulars. Ultimately, the resistance movement became primarily a massive indigenous mobilization that reinforced the fears of the Andean elite and sounded alarms throughout Spanish America. In central Mexico, the multiracial Hidalgo and Morelos movements began in 1810 by a Creole priest, Father Miguel Hidalgo (1753–1811), and led later by a mestizo priest, Father José María Morelos (1765–1815); promoted the expulsion of all Peninsulars and the unification of all Americans under the banner of the Lady of Guadalupe. The battle cry, “Long live the Virgin of Guadalupe, and death to the Spaniards!” proved highly effective among thousands of poor rural people, although few Creoles joined the rebellion. Creole-led forces actually helped repress these popular rebellions in Mexico and Peru. The late colonial rebellions demonstrated to Creoles how they could potentially lose control over large indigenous populations; however, Creoles understood well that they could not gain independence without popular support.

Nativism and its keyword, Americanos, became the Creole strategy to garner widespread support. The glorification of American identity defined by birthplace rather than race helped unify multiracial populations in Spanish America and Brazil while transforming Peninsulars into foreign enemies. In addition, the rhetorical, popular appeal of nativism proved highly compatible with liberalism and its tenets of liberty, equality, and popular sovereignty, which guided the Creole patriots’ push for independence. In effect, Creole patriotism use of nativism forged a rupture with models of colonial identity and introduced the earliest elements of nationalism in Latin America.

The post-independence era, however, revealed the insincerity of the Creoles’ nativist call. Liberal patrons such as Simón Bolívar (1783–1830) viewed racial diversity as a significant obstacle to democracy, which led him...
to advocate for a strong lifetime executive as well as hereditary political appointments in Gran Colombia. In the mid-nineteenth century, Argentine liberal Domingo F. Sarmiento (1811–1888) echoed Bolívar's lack of faith in the nonwhite population, albeit in much more explicit terms. He promoted education and immigration as means to counter what he deemed a barbaric Spanish and Indian past, and he famously called for the extermination of the gaucho in the pampas. On the other hand, conservative elites and caudillos in the nineteenth century fought to restore the colonial order, particularly through the reestablishment of the privileges of the church and landowners, as well as by reaffirming social hierarchies. Sarmiento's nemesis, Juan Manuel de Rosas (1793–1878), forged alliances with mestizo gauchos, and he conscripted Afro-Argentines into his frontier militias while at the same time imposing authoritarian rule. In contrast to liberals who demanded assimilation and homogeneity for integration in the nation, conservatives revived racialized forms of subordinate incorporation.

Nonetheless, peasants and other popular groups took political actions that shaped nation-building in the nineteenth century, albeit to varying degrees throughout the region. In Mexico, the popular or communitarian liberal nationalism of the Puebla highlands challenged the reform movement led by Benito Juárez (1806–1872) and elite liberals in the 1850s and their resistance to the French intervention from 1862 to 1867. Juárez, a Zapotec who later became the first indigenous national to serve as president, and his supporters faced the organized efforts of a radicalized and youthful peasant movement that rejected individual property rights and upheld communal landholdings and popular education. In effect, Puebla villages articulated an alternative nationalism during the Reforma period that influenced the outcome of liberal-conservative conflicts in the mid-nineteenth century. In late nineteenth-century Peru, on the other hand, Indian peasant communities of the Mantaro Valley supported patriot struggles against Chilean occupation. However, after the War of the Pacific (1879–1883), Nicolás de Piérola (1839–1913), known as the founder of the Peruvian modern state, and his successors combined physical repression and paternalistic rhetoric to revive the marginalization of indigenous communities. Despite key differences, both cases underscore how intricate processes of alliances, divisions, and conflicts between Indian peasant communities and national elites contributed to state formation outcomes in the post-independence period.

NEOCOLONIALISM AND SCIENTIFIC RACISM

Despite many transformations, by the late nineteenth century Latin America experienced internal and external processes that many historians argue created neocolonialism. Despite a boom in export economies that reorganized regional power, most of Latin America remained subordinate to foreign powers, namely Great Britain and increasingly the United States. Although slavery came to an end, the export boom prompted the expansion of plantations and commercial agriculture. Landowners supported emergent authoritarian governments that functioned as either oligarchies or dictatorships that served to facilitate economic expansion and promote the positivist ideals of order and progress.

Simultaneously, the racial theories that prevailed in Europe and the United States from roughly 1870 to 1920 influenced dictatorial and oligarchic visions for modernization. Throughout Latin America, a close link existed between the scientific racism of the era and policy reform. National leaders argued for education and immigration as primary means to transform supposedly backward peoples into disciplined, productive citizens. The racialized implications of the project were clear: education could forge cultural homogeneity, while promotion of European immigration would supposedly whiten racially heterogeneous populations.

National leaders and intellectuals drew upon the racial theories of Europe and the United States by selectively borrowing from thinkers such as Gustave Le Bon (1841–1931), Arthur de Gobineau (1816–1882), Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), and Francis Galton (1822–1911) in order to adapt the ideas to local contexts. The appropriation and adaptation of racial science by political and intellectual leaders reflected their diverse if not anguished response to scientific racism from abroad.

Most intellectuals in Brazil ignored the scientific assertions about the immutability of race and condemnation of racial mixture and instead opted to promote whitening ideals and practices through miscegenation and immigration. Argentina, which had a less diverse population due to the brutal killings of indigenous groups in the colonial period and the seeming disappearance of Africans through racial mixture, could more easily embrace scientific racism. Yet it, too, conveniently adapted theories by ignoring ethnic differences and scientific hierarchies imposed upon Europeans themselves by making no distinction between Spaniards, Italians, and the English. Throughout the whole region, however, racialist thinking drove policy decisions. Argentina, Brazil, and Cuba implemented new immigration laws. Brazil and Cuba used racial science to defend particular responses to criminal behavior. In Cuba, the U.S. occupation after the Spanish-American-Cuban War of 1898 proved influential on race relations as well. Cuba witnessed segregationist policies, shifts in electoral legislation, and violent repression of a black political party. Racial theorizing in
Argentina led to the scapegoating of Russian Jews for labor unrest. Prerevolutionary Mexico under the rule of Porfirio Díaz (1830–1915) had drawn on racial science to rationalize the dispossession of rural indigenous communities. The tension between the reality of racial diversity and the logic of racial science would endure even among the later nationalists who allegedly opposed scientific racism.

At the same time, U.S. imperialism in the region also unleashed a separate strain of thought among Latin American writers who began to extol the distinct virtues of a supposed Latin American “race” vis-à-vis the assumed national characteristics of the United States. The U.S. takeover of Cuba and Puerto Rico after the Spanish-American–Cuban War of 1898, alongside interventions in Panama in 1903 and military occupations in Nicaragua (1912–1933) and the Dominican Republic (1916–1924), betrayed the enduring assumption of a quartet of Indian communities into the state. A diversity of mestizaje, which celebrated indigenous, peasant, and worker identities and also offered visible nationalist images on public spaces that affirmed Latin American nations.

Marti’s intellectual successor, the Uruguayan essayist José Enrique Rodó (1872–1917), proved even more influential with his essay Ariel, which was published in 1900. Rodó drew upon William Shakespeare’s The Tempest to develop a debate between Ariel, who represents Latin America, and Caliban, who represents North America, about the future course of history. Rodó, like Martí, admired the United States for its industry, but worried that U.S. utilitarianism led to materialism, which he found incompatible with, if not dangerous to, Latin American nations. He encouraged Latin Americans to reject materialism and instead embrace idealism and aestheticism, which he argued were more compatible with the Latin American essence and spirit. Latin American intellectuals like Rodó and Martí, among others, embraced anti-imperialism, rejected former models of progress, and inverted North Atlantic ideas about the inferiority of Latin American populations. These early articulations of a new Latin American identity and distinct pan-national character would serve as a foundation for nationalists of the twentieth century to build upon.

POPULISM AND MESTIZAJE

The new nationalism that spread throughout the region in the first half of the twentieth century proved to be a watershed in the region. Early twentieth-century nationalists sought to shatter neocolonial paradigms that had achieved little national integration and to develop more ambitious and inclusive nationalisms. The nationalistic effort from roughly 1910 to 1950 was an extension of the nativism of the independence period, but now with a strong economic agenda, a more powerful articulation of ethnic and cultural identity, and an explicit advocacy of marginalized groups. In short, twentieth-century nationalists began to focus on public welfare in ways the liberals of the nineteenth century had failed to do. These early twentieth-century efforts manifested in unifying discourses of racial similarity, expanded concepts of citizenship that now included even women, and popular mobilizations. Mexico and Brazil are the two most prominent examples.

The nationalist surge erupted with the onset of the twentieth century’s first great social revolution: the Mexican Revolution. Initially, the revolution sought to overthrow the thirty-four-year dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz. An armed conflict ensued from 1910 to 1920 with competing national visions put forth by popular leaders, such as the agrarian leader Emiliano Zapata (1879–1919) and the labor leader Pancho Villa (1878–1923). The new constitution of 1917 also showed a strong nationalist orientation as it reclaimed all subsoil rights, limited the rights of foreigners, and protected indigenous communal lands, called ejidos.

Military and legal events were crucial to the development of the revolution; however, the cultural change brought on by the intellectual contribution of mestizaje proved to be its most enduring legacy. Various key thinkers, writers, politicians, and artists—such as José Vasconcelos (1882–1959), Manuel Gamio (1883–1960), Diego Rivera (1886–1957), Alfonso Caso (1896–1970), and Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán (1908–1996)—addressed the issue of race in Mexico directly during the institutional phase of the revolution from 1920 to 1940. Vasconcelos argued that Latin American miscegenation was producing a superior “Cosmic Race.” Others, like Gamio and Caso, developed the idea of indigenismo, which celebrated indigenous culture and heritage and advocated for the incorporation of Indian communities into the state. A diversity of thought existed among indigenistas, practitioners of indigenismo as they were not a monolithic activist group. However, discourses of mestizaje and indigenismo were not necessarily incompatible; rather, they often reinforced each other. The state-sponsored work of the Mexican muralists, also diverse in their politics and style, left indelible nationalist images on public spaces that affirmed indigenous, peasant, and worker identities and also offered a revisionist history of the Mexican pueblo. Ultimately, the collective expressions of the revolutionary nationalism produced a national popular culture embodied in newly
celebrated folk music (corridos), traditional food (tamales, moles), and folk art (papel-maché skeletons, indigenous wood carvings and pottery).

Brazilian intellectuals also described their nation in inclusive and antiracist terms that were grounded in the notion of a “racial democracy” and the interests of the Estado Novo, or New State, of the 1930s. The Estado Novo, directed by Getulio Vargas (1883–1954), was a highly authoritarian government that dissolved legislative bodies, banned political parties, and censored the mass media. It was also a pragmatic and flexible regime that achieved an unprecedented multiracial alliance and gained widespread support. Its success lies in part in the prolific state-sponsored production of nationalist culture and symbols, such as samba music and dance, regional literatures, and Brazilian modernist art best exemplified in the work of the Grupo de Cinco (Group of Five). Like the Mexican Revolution, the Estado Novo also addressed the issue of race explicitly. Vargas drew upon anthropologist Gilberto Freyre’s 1933 book The Masters and the Slaves to promote ideas about racial harmony in Brazil. Freyre argued that all Brazilians should embrace the nation’s unique national and ethnic identities, which were constituted by the nation’s African heritage and the supposed consensual sexual unions between the white male master and the black slave mistress on colonial plantations. Freyre’s interpretations introduced the controversial idea of Brazilian racial democracy and inspired the Lusotropicalism movement. The former perpetuated notions about miscegenation’s power to unify and democratize Brazilian society, while the latter assumed Portuguese proclivities for harmonious cultural and racial mixing.

These nationalistic expressions in the first half of the twentieth century, however flawed and problematic, reached a broad spectrum of Latin Americans, inspired a collective self-discovery, and forged both national and regional unification. On the other hand, nationalist thought in this period did not fully transcend racialized paradigms rooted in biological and cultural markers. Nonetheless, the classic nationalist era mobilized formerly marginalized groups—namely, indigenous, African, and women’s groups—that would challenge nationalist assumptions and unveil social realities about race and ethnicity in the post–World War II era.

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**NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY: THE MIDDLE EAST**

The origin and evolution of Middle Eastern nationalism remains a controversial topic. In the traditional view, nationalism preceded and gave birth to the nation-states that evolved out of the Ottoman Empire (c. 1301–1922). Members of oppressed national groups, deprived of their cultural, economic, or political rights, demanded states independent of Ottoman domination. A more recent interpretation argues that the nation-state often preceded nationalism, with the latter only subsequently emerging. According to this line of thought, the new state, in order to prosper and preserve itself, created and promoted the growth of national identity within its borders. These two interpretations are not mutually exclusive, and because the Ottoman Empire was a highly diverse collection of ethnic and religious bodies, both find some support in the available evidence.

**COMPETING FORMS OF NATIONALIST EXPRESSION**

In parts of the Ottoman Empire, tendencies toward nationalism were clearly visible in the second half of the nineteenth century; however, most of them did not develop into sustained political movements until the early twentieth century. While the evidence of mounting
discontent is clear, the motivations of the disparate separatist movements often remain in doubt. According to most contemporary observers, the Ottoman Empire was well intentioned in its reform efforts, but the incomplete nature of those reforms left many subjects discontented. For example, the state in the second half of the nineteenth century attempted to bring about some level of equality between Muslims and non-Muslims, as well as more equitable relations between elites and common citizens; however, the slow implementation of those steps resulted in mounting frustration and led to occasional revolts. Another school of thought, prominent in the first half of the twentieth century, is less kind to the Ottoman administration, emphasizing what many of the empire’s subjects viewed as economic and political oppression. Deprived of political rights and driven by mounting poverty as a result of Ottoman maladministration, local leaders, according to this school of thought, inevitably developed nationalist sentiments that led to independence movements.

Armenian nationalism, for example, had its roots in the mid-sixteenth century, but it did not become a prominent issue in the Ottoman Empire until the latter part of the nineteenth century. Following the Ottoman defeat in the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), the ensuing Congress of Berlin (1878) mentioned the possibility of an autonomous Armenia, transforming the issue from an internal problem into an international one. Thereafter, the Ottoman administration looked upon any expression of Armenian national identity as a possible precursor for the realization of an autonomous state. Unparalleled in ferocity and scope, Ottoman attacks against its Armenian population led to what many scholars have described as massacres in 1895 to 1896, 1908, 1909, 1912, and finally and most notably, 1915 to 1916. While this is the dominant view, a minority of observers, including some non-Turks, argue the number of Armenians killed in this period was exaggerated. Outside Armenia, manifestations of Armenian nationalism, marked by a strong component of a lost time and place, can still be found today within Armenian diasporic communities.

From at least the late nineteenth century, the Kurdish minority in the Ottoman Empire also made repeated efforts to achieve self-rule if not statehood. The Kurdish poet Haji Qadiri Koyi (1818–1897) was among the first to express modernist nationalist ideas, and a failed Kurdish revolt against the Ottoman Empire occurred as early as 1879 to 1880. The Constitutional Revolution in Iran from 1906 to 1911 and the Young Turk revolt in Turkey in 1908 later combined to deny the Kurds any degree of self-rule. The end of World War I (1914–1918) led to the redistribution of Ottoman Kurdistan among the newly formed states of Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Over the ensuing decades, repeated nationalist revolts took place in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, but none of them led to the creation of an independent Kurdistan. Kurdish nationalism remains a powerful force in parts of five modern states, Armenia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, which constitute a nominal Kurdistan; however, only one small province in Iran is officially named Kurdistan.

Tendencies toward Arab nationalism were visible as early as the 1860s, but they did not develop into a small but sustained political movement until the early twentieth century, following the Young Turk revolt and the subsequent restoration of the Ottoman constitution of 1876. These events led to greater freedom of the press and increased political expression throughout the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. A tendency that came to be known as Arabism, a term used to describe early Arab nationalism and to differentiate it from Ottomanism, emerged at this time and began to spread throughout the Arab world. Stressing the ethnic identity of the Arabs and their common cultural roots, Arabists called for the equality of Arabs with other national groups within the empire. Influenced by European models of nationalism, Arabism was also influenced by reinterpretations of the Arab and Islamic past, as well as the rise of nationalism among other ethnic groups, like the Armenians and Kurds.

When considering the competing forms of nationalism present in the Middle East at the outset of the twentieth century, the divisive impact of local and regional attachments as well as the cultural pluralism of the region must be recognized. The incomplete and unsettled nature of political identity throughout the Ottoman Empire was an underlying but highly important cause of the turbulence that came to characterize twentieth-century Middle Eastern politics. The Muslim majority itself was never a unified entity, and the competition did not stop at the Sunni-Shia divide. It extended to lesser sects, like the Yazidis of Yemen, the Alawites of Syria, and the Druze of Lebanon, often small in number but highly influential in a locality or region. In addition, there were non-Muslim Arabs, including Christians and Jews, and non-Arab Muslims, including Bebers and Kurds. This potpourri of peoples, races, and religions fostered a variety of competing nationalist movements, including Islamic nationalism and Zionism. As early as the Young Turk period, for example, increasingly visible Zionist activity in Palestine became a regional political issue with Arab nationalists who were becoming wary of the Zionist challenge, charging that the Young Turks supported Zionism.

As is evident from this discussion of Armenian, Kurdish, and Arab nationalism, the growth of nationalist movements played a role in the destruction of the
Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, it would appear that the overwhelming majority of Ottoman subjects, as late as World War I, were seeking reform as opposed to separation and would have remained within an Ottoman state framework if that political entity had continued to exist. As late as the 1915–1916 period, for example, an Arab revolt in the Hijaz led by Shaykh Husayn (1854–1931), the head of the Hashemite clan and the guardian of Mecca, was viewed with disfavor by many politically concerned Arabs in the Fertile Crescent.

With the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, there was no longer an established political order standing in the way of diverse nationalist movements. Turkish nationalism had roots in the mid-nineteenth century and was a motivating force during the Turkish war of independence (1919–1923). Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), the founder of the modern Turkish nation, later encouraged the inhabitants of Anatolia to embrace Kemalism, officially adopted as the ideology of the ruling party in 1931. Kemalism emphasized six themes: nationalism, republicanism, populism, statism, secularism, and Ataturk, interpreted by moderates as reformism and by radicals as revolution. Confronted with a new nation with a wide variety of ethnicities, races, and religions, Atatürk advocated an inclusive form of nationalism in which a Turk was defined as anyone who spoke Turkish or called himself or herself a Turk.

INTERWAR PERIOD

After World War I, Arab nationalism began to take form as a wider political movement. In competition with Islam and nation-state nationalism as alternative political ideologies, the influence of Arab nationalism slowly spread throughout the Mashriq or eastern Arab world, and in succeeding decades, throughout the entire region. Aspiriting to an independent Arab state or a federation of states from the Arabian Peninsula to the Fertile Crescent, Arabist ambitions conflicted with the postwar policies of France and Great Britain in the Middle East. Under the auspices of the League of Nations, the European powers had divided the region into mandates, protectorates, and nominally independent states, all of which were strongly influenced by their European patrons.

The perpetuation of these artificial political divisions imposed by the European powers encouraged the evolution of competing forms of nationalism. On the one hand, the citizens of the newly created nation-states naturally began to develop attachments to them and the interests they represented. On the other, there remained this powerful, unrealized, and somewhat utopian aspiration for unity among all the Arab peoples. These conflicting nationalist sentiments first surfaced during the interwar years in the newly created nation-states of the Fertile Crescent, namely, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria; however, they were mirrored in later years in other Arab lands, including Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Tunisia, and Yemen.

At the same time, the considerable variation in the origins and evolution of nationalism in the widely scattered areas of the Middle East must be acknowledged. The Arab revolt in the Hijaz (1916) was directed against centralization rather than foreign rule, and development of Arab nationalism in this area rested less on the revolt itself and more on the subsequent imposition of European mandates. In Iraq, nationalism was more anti-European than anti-Ottoman. In Libya, nationalism, anti-imperialism, and pan-Islamic loyalties were closely associated following the failure in 1923 of efforts to win political autonomy. In Egypt, the nationalist Wafd Party, with a goal of complete and total independence, was the governing party for much of the so-called liberal period, which ended with a military coup in 1952. The interwar period also witnessed the creation in Egypt of The Society of Muslim Brothers. Founded by Shaykh Hasan al-Banna (1896–1949) in 1928, the Brotherhood advocated an orthodox Islamic view of society and politics. In contrast, Reza Pahlavi (1878–1944), who founded the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran in 1925, urged Iranian nationalism on the country’s many ethnic minorities to facilitate the building of a modern state.

In the interwar period, Arab nationalism received its first major challenge in the form of Zionism, a competing ethnic nationalism. Created to foster the establishment of a Jewish state, Zionism was based on the idea that Jews, wherever they resided, constituted a single people. Early Zionists explored a variety of locations for a future Jewish state, including Uganda in East Africa and Cyrenaica in contemporary Libya; however, the first World Zionist Congress, organized by Theodore Herzl (1860–1904) in Basel, Switzerland, in 1897, set its sights on Palestine. Impressed by the vigor of the challenger, Arab writers in the 1930s addressed the strengths of Zionism point by point in an effort to stimulate Arabism.

The tension between the conflicting sentiments of Arab and nation-state nationalism continued in the wake of World War II (1939–1945). On the one hand, there was widespread recognition throughout the Arab world that Arabs shared a culture, history, and language, commonalities that might be used to create a joint political expression and enable them to overcome the fragmentation and weakness that characterized their recent history. These ideas were especially appealing to the Arab masses, often referred to in contemporary times as the Arab street, and were skillfully exploited by politicians and publicists to generate enthusiasm within individual countries and throughout the region. On the other hand, the
longer the post–World War I nation-states endured, the more they engendered a powerful network of vested interests and took on an aura of permanence.

The Charter of the League of Arab States, or the Arab League, established in March 1945, epitomized this growing paradox. An organization whose very creation was a function of Arab nationalism reaffirmed in its charter the independence of the signatory states, required decisions to be made unanimously and to be binding, and rejected interference in the internal affairs of any Arab state by others. The principal test of the Arab League came with the partition of Palestine in 1947 and the creation of Israel in 1948, events that traumatized the Arab body politic. The outcome of the Palestine war also challenged the validity of the concept of separate states aligned in a loose confederation, and in so doing, it put heightened emphasis on the need for unity among the Arabs.

RISE AND FALL OF ARAB NATIONALISM

The 1950s and 1960s proved to be the heyday of Arab nationalism, a time in which it was the predominant ideology in the Middle East. Thanks in large part to the charismatic Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970), together with the organization and mobilization skills of parties and movements like the Ba'th (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party in Syria and the Movement of Arab Nationalists in Palestine and elsewhere, Arab nationalism was on the ascent throughout the Arab world. In Egypt, Arab nationalism supplanted Egyptian nationalism following the overthrow of the monarchy in 1952. While the Suez crisis in 1956 confirmed Nasser in his role as an all-Arab leader, he had begun to assume the mantle in early 1955 when he launched a vigorous diplomatic offensive against the Baghdad Pact (a 1955 agreement guaranteeing its signatories’ security: Great Britain, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan). Nasser’s popularity and Arab nationalism both peaked in the long decade between the July 1956 Suez crisis and the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

The decline of Arab nationalism proved as rapid as its ascent. The Arab defeat in the June 1967 war dealt a severe blow to the prestige of Arab leaders and to the confidence of the Arab people, undermining the legitimacy of revolutionary regimes from Cairo to Damascus. Following the death of Nasser in 1970, Anwar Sadat (1918–1981) pursued an increasingly independent policy in which Arab nationalism was subordinated to Egyptian interests and concerns. In Syria, the rise to power of Hafez al-Assad (1930–2000) in 1970 marked the decline of the Ba’thist commitment to Arab nationalism and unity in favor of a more pragmatic ideology. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein (1937–2006) dominated the political scene after 1968 in a ruthless dictatorship marked less by nationalism and more by the use of violence on a scale unmatched in the country’s history. In Iran, the overthrow of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1919–1980) in 1979 led to the proclamation of an Islamic republic. For the Palestinians, the lesson they took from the 1967 war was that they could not depend on Arab armies to defeat Israel; therefore, they resolved in the guise of Palestinian nationalism to do more in the future for themselves. As for Zionism, Israel’s victory in the June 1967 war, accompanied as it was by an occupation of Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank, strengthened the Zionist movement, which was galvanized by a new religious zealotry.

The Libyan leader, Mu’ammar al-Qaddafi (b. 1942), after his Free Unionist Officers movement ousted the Libyan monarchy on September 1, 1969, attempted to revive Arab nationalism through his Third Universal Theory and in the subsequent publication of his socio-economic and political manifesto, The Green Book (1974). Qaddafi embraced Arab nationalism, and the revolutionary ideology developed under its umbrella provided the framework for Libyan foreign policy after 1969; nevertheless, his approach to the subject added nothing new in terms of content or direction. Modeling his speeches on those delivered by Nasser some two decades earlier, Qaddafi’s reiteration of tired, shopworn, familiar phrases on those delivered by Nasser some two decades earlier, Qaddafi’s reiteration of tired, shopworn, familiar tropes and discredited ideas fell on deaf ears.

NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY

Nationalism and ethnicity remain important political forces in the contemporary Middle East. As the power of Arab nationalism declined, it was increasingly challenged by nation-state nationalism and the reemergence of Islamist ideologies that provided an alternate political discourse and social movement in the Muslim world. Even as they occasionally supported the wider concept of Arab unity, the leaders of nation-states from Syria to Egypt to Algeria have nurtured the growth of national identity as a means to promote nation-building and to generate political support for the domestic and foreign policies of standing governments. At the same time, ethnic identities and solidarities, like the aforementioned Kurds or the Tuareg in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, and Niger, have continued to challenge national autonomy in many parts of the region, seeking socioeconomic and political recognition across state or national boundaries. Finally, the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 gave rise to opposition movements throughout the Middle East critical of the adoption by Muslim elites of the Western ideologies of nationalism, secularism, and socialism, calling instead for the restoration of Islamic law.
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NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY: NORTH AMERICA

North American nationalism is frequently positioned as unique, and it has attracted only sporadic interest over the years. In the aftermath of World War II (1939–1945), the United States, especially, was regarded as offering an alternative to the divisive, ethnic-based European nationalisms in the proposition that Americans are unlike other peoples, that they are, in fundamental ways, exceptional (Kohn 1944, 1957; Lipset 1963, 1996). As the product of mass migrations from Europe and Africa, and absent historical ethnic and genealogical ties, North America’s nations have sometimes been adjudged lacking nationalism at all, or they are seen as “plural” national constructs shaped by their colonist-immigrant origins (Smith 1998).

The immigrant origins of the North American nation-states predisposed them to civic rather than ethnic nationalism; these are flip sides of the same nationalist coin, though hardly alter ego. For both the United States and Canada, the civic ideal was constructed on a white ethnic base, and the history of nationalism in North America as a whole can be read as an ongoing struggle between civic nationalist and ethno-cultural representations of the nation. In the United States, nationalism is perceived to be structured around an overarching civil religion, dedicated to the protection of both cultural and ethnic diversity, but compromised by its initial articulation, in English, by a dominant white Anglo-Protestant ethnic core (Higham 1955; Kaufmann 2004). In Canada, the development of a single unifying civic nationalism was compromised by the presence of two separate immigrant ethnic cores: one French Canadian (Canadien), located in New France (Quebec); the other English Canadians (Budzier and Francis 2006). The division of Quebec in 1971 into Upper Canada, where the majority was English-speaking, and Lower Canada, where it was French-speaking, consolidated a linguistic diversity that has become the defining characteristic of Canada.

In the United States, especially, was regarded as offering an alternative to the divisive, ethnic-based European nationalisms in the proposition that Americans are unlike other peoples, that they are, in fundamental ways, exceptional (Kohn 1944, 1957; Lipset 1963, 1996). As the product of mass migrations from Europe and Africa, and absent historical ethnic and genealogical ties, North America’s nations have sometimes been adjudged lacking nationalism at all, or they are seen as “plural” national constructs shaped by their colonist-immigrant origins (Smith 1998).
Nationalism and Ethnicity: North America

expressed was grounded in their country of origin or, increasingly, in the individual states in which they resided. The dominance of the British white elites, however, meant that it was under the banner of the rights of freeborn Englishmen, as this concept was broadly understood in the eighteenth century, that colonial leaders rallied opposition to rule from London (Greenfeld 1992; Foner 1998). They sustained a protracted conflict against both the British Crown and each other to emerge from colonial rule a nation, but a nation absent the nationalism that later mythmakers would identify as the force behind the American War of Independence itself. The nation preceded nationalism in the American case. By throwing off colonial rule, the independence had been achieved to construct a new kind of civic nationalism predicated on a new form of republican government heralded by the Declaration of Independence’s (1776) assertion that “all men are created equal.”

REVOLUTIONARY INHERITANCES

For the colonies north of the new United States, the American Revolution instigated a perspective, still problematic to this day, of reactive or negative nationalism. Loyalists (those loyal to the British Crown) who moved into Canada defined themselves against those colonists whose nationalism, if not yet American, was no longer fully British. Not that Canadian nationalism was loyalty writ large, but later Lower Canadian attempts (1837–1838) to break away from British rule were unsuccessful, and were, as the American Revolution has also been described, as much about who should rule at home as about home rule or nationalism per se. Constitutional independence, achieved with the formation of the Dominion of Canada in 1867, positioned Canadian nationalism between two stools: one promoting accommodation with the British world; the other, a powerful French-speaking minority, seeking the protection of a distinctive French-Canadian (les Canadiens français) culture.

In America, by contrast, revolution had created a fully separate nation and a functioning federal union, with many of the outward trappings of nationalism but not yet the imagined community (Anderson 1983) that made such nationalism a cohesive and durable force. America’s leaders, from the first president, George Washington (1732–1799), onward, frequently emphasized both the need for unity between the individual states and the voluntary nature of American nationalism. Their efforts to encourage both were grounded in the new nation’s founding documents: the Declaration of Independence, which asserted the rights of the colonies to be free and independent states, and the U.S. Constitution, which established the framework of government. The new nation also trumpeted its civic nationalist credentials in the Great Seal, which announced “Incipit Novus Ordo Seclorum” (a new order of the ages is born), and on the obverse side, “E Pluribus Unum” (out of many, one).

By the nineteenth century, a powerful national myth of origins defined American nationalism. Beginning with the religiously motivated “erand into the wilderness” of the early Puritan settlers to New England, moving through the Revolution as an expression of universal rights, and culminating in the concept of what became known as “manifest destiny,” the nation’s divinely ordained right to pursue westward expansion, this origin myth positioned America as uniquely situated among nations to provide an example to the world. This highlighted Americans’ attempts to develop a national identity separate from that of the Old World European nations, to assert their position as a “chosen people,” but in almost all respects this was a nationalism informed by the European racial and ethnic assumptions of the original dominant ethnic core.

From the colonial period through the Revolution, the idea of America as a new kind of nation, and Americans as a new kind of people was countered by American determination to be a nation in the European mold. America’s civic ambitions were, from the start, couched in distinctly ethnic language. The “We, the people” cited in the Constitution asserted the country’s nationhood on the basis of a universal right to liberty and described the colonial relationship as one of enslavement. But in drafting the Constitution, Americans excluded their own slaves from the national polity, assigning them the status of three-fifths of a person for representational purposes. Indeed, the words slave and slavery did not appear in the original Constitution at all, lest they undermine the civic idealism that the document represented (Foner 1998). Skin color proved the means to inclusion for many immigrant groups, and exclusion for both indigenous and imported nonwhite peoples. Even before the colonies broke away from Great Britain, ethnic divisions had begun to supplant class divisions in a society where racial slavery was becoming the norm (Foner 1998).

The contrived conceptualization of the new nation as, in effect, a birthright community comprising the descendants of a single immigrant (Anglo-Saxon) group was codified in the 1790 Naturalization Law, which offered citizenship only to “free white persons.” This conceptualization was reinforced in the mid-nineteenth century by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney’s (1777–1864) ruling in denial of black citizenship rights in the 1857 Dred Scott case. Countering this invocation of a mythical homogeneous polity, which was hardly applicable to a nation of immigrants, was a renewed emphasis, by African Americans in particular, on the voluntary nature of American nationalism and on the Declaration of
Independence as symbolic of the ideals that the nation represented. This divide constituted a major fault line in American nationalism. It fomented a separate nationalist impulse in southern states where racial slavery had, by the nineteenth century, become a social as much as an economic institution. This resulted, in 1861, in the outbreak of a civil war that was, in essence, a conflict over nationalism, with one side, the Confederacy (South), seeking a separate national existence, and the other, the Union (North), asserting via its own variant of nationalism the dominance of the federal government over the American state (Grant 2000; Kohn 1957).

**NEW NATIONS VERSUS FIRST NATIONS**

Nineteenth-century North America was, as far as nationalism goes, very much in flux. It can be argued, indeed, that the presence of nonwhite peoples deemed unsuitable for assimilation to the dominant ethnic core influenced the direction and nature of nationalism in North America. Certainly Native Americans or First Nation peoples (the former term is specific to the United States, the latter to Canada), in particular, occupied, and continue to occupy, an uneasy borderland, in terms of both state and status, between the United States and Canada.

The separation or assimilation of nonwhite peoples was a major point of debate throughout the nineteenth century, and impacted both Native Americans and African Americans. The American Colonization Society (ACS), founded in 1816, argued for the removal of free African Americans from the United States as a means of satisfying both abolitionists, who feared that free blacks would never enjoy full rights in white society, and slave owners, who simply feared free blacks. In the same year (1819) that Congress allocated funding to the ACS, it passed the Indian Civilization Act, designed to assimilate Native Americans into white society and thereby facilitate white expansion. Under the U.S. Constitution, Native Americans, as aboriginal inhabitants, were understood to hold a separate tribal sovereignty outside the white American polity, but the nation’s westward expansion impinged on tribal lands, and forced relocations of the tribes in advance of white settlement, especially in Georgia and Florida. The Indian Removal Act of 1830 was designed to remove any Indian tribes still living east of the Mississippi, and over the next few years many were forcibly moved west.

Acculturation remained an ongoing process, however, in both Canada and the United States during the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, but merging the native with the nation proved problematic. Paralleling the approach adopted in other British-dominated settler societies, such as Australia, residential school systems, many run by religious organizations, removed native children from their familial and social environment in an attempt to inculcate them with the religious, linguistic, and educational values of white society. This enforced acculturation, designed to assert white nationalist values over native ones, was reinforced in the United States by a series of supporting measures, such as the Dawes Act (1887), which offered citizenship to natives willing to relinquish tribal affiliations. Such measures met resistance from Native American organizations, who viewed them, with justification, as a form of ethnocide.

The Society of American Indians (founded in 1911), many of whose leaders emerged from the off-reservation educational establishments, sought to establish native claims to American civic nationalism, but did so at a time when a rising interest in the distinctiveness of “minority” cultures undermined the “melting pot” ideal of a nationalism predicated on diversity. Under the Indian Citizenship Act (1924), Native Americans were granted the right to vote, although as a right relegated to individual states this legislation was not fully implemented until 1948. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the “Indian New Deal,” achieved, at best, an uneasy compromise between settler and native society in the United States, and failed to alter in any substantial way the native role in American nationalism, which often paralleled the exclusion of other groups, including blacks and Asians, from its civic ideal. In Canada, and absent the broader civic nationalist construction of the United States, First Nation peoples remained outside the polity, as far as voting was concerned, until 1960.

**RACE, ETHNIC NATION**

The tortuous route to full citizenship for Native Americans was paralleled by the experience of African Americans and other non-WASP groups, even though the American Civil War (1861–1865) had, with the Union victory, transformed the 1863 Emancipation Proclamation into the Thirteenth Amendment and abolished slavery, leaving the way clear for the civic nationalism of America to be truly inclusive of all citizens regardless of creed or color. The persistence of de facto segregation, however, undermined both the ideal and the nationalism constructed around it. North and South had reached consensus by the dawn of the twentieth century, but it was, in many ways, a white male consensus, predicated on a combination of nostalgia for the past and deep-rooted opposition to an integrated society. What followed was a process of ideological and ethnic entrenchment, set against a background of the debate over nationalism in the context of the various immigration acts passed by Congress, several of which, notably the Chinese Exclusion Acts of 1882, 1892, and 1902, the
Nonwhite immigration has prompted extended debate over the linguistic lineaments of nationalism, with the political pressure group U.S. English (founded in 1983) promoting English as the language of state. Strongest in California, this movement has seen many states react against immigration by adopting English-only legislation (Schmid 2001; Huntington 2004). Fear of immigrant influence also prompted California’s Proposition 187 (1994), or the “Save Our State” initiative, to deny educational and health-care benefits to illegal immigrants, although this initiative was later ruled unconstitutional.

Although frequently perceived as more tolerant than the United States, Canada has likewise struggled with anti-immigrant sentiment, expressed prior to 2000 via the Reform Party of Canada (Parti reformiste du Canada). The clash between religious expression and the secular requirements of civic nationalism in a multicultural state, notably in the hijab controversy in 2007 and in Quebec in 2009, highlight the challenges involved in merging the competing claims of French Canadians, English Canadians, First Nation peoples, and newer immigrant minorities into a functioning civic nationalism absent the ethnic legacies that too often produce division out of diversity.

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The central premise of Arab nationalism is the idea that the Arab people are linked by special bonds of language and history (and, some would add, religion) and that their political structures should reflect in some sense this reality. Pan-Arabism, the desire or drive for Arab political unity through a unitary Arab state, is a corollary of Arab nationalism. Some scholars argue that it is possible to be an Arab nationalist and not a pan-Arabist, but others contend the two are inseparable, with unity an essential component of Arab nationalist ideology. Differing concepts of nationalism are at the heart of the distinction between Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism, with the essential debate centered on whether nationalism is defined solely in cultural terms or includes a practical political dimension. Defined in cultural terms, nationalism is grounded in a common language and a shared history and destiny. With the addition of political terms, it goes beyond shared cultural elements to include the notion of sovereign independence. Discounting the ethnic, religious, and political divisions that have long existed in the Arab world, pan-Arabists argue that the political institutions of the region should reflect what they view as an indivisible Arab community.

INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS

Pan-Arabism as an ideology and political movement of Arab unity is grounded in the Arab nationalist ideology that began to develop in the Arab world in the second half of the nineteenth century. In this period, a tendency emerged and began to spread across the Arab world. It stressed the ethnic identity of the Arabs, together with their common cultural roots, and called for the equality of Arabs with other national groups in the Ottoman Empire.

The Arabist tendency built on the work of a wide variety of individuals and movements. One of these was a group called the Nahda, Arabic for renaissance or awakening. Its members pioneered a cultural renaissance of the Arabic language that began in Egypt and later spread to other Arabic-speaking countries. Prominent members of the movement included the Egyptian Rifa‘ al-Tahtawi (1801–1873); Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897), who was born either in Afghanistan or Iran; and the Egyptian Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905). Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the Nahda produced new editions of the classics of Arabic literature, along with dictionaries, encyclopedias, and histories, mainly in Beirut and Cairo. Islamic reformers known as the Salafis constituted a second influential group. This school of thought surfaced in the second half of the nineteenth century as a reaction to the spread of European ideas and worked to expose the roots of modernity within Muslim civilization. Originating largely in Lebanon and Syria, the members of this group argued for a return to the practices of the earliest days of Islam, emphasizing in the process the period of history in which the Arabs were dominant. While not always uniform in thought, the Syrians Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935), ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1849–1902), Tahir al-Jaza’iri (1852–1920), and Jamal al-Din al-Qasim (1886–1914) were among the more important representatives of this group.

In addition, almost every region and many districts in the Arab world had their own distinctive mix of journalists, pamphleteers, and preachers with their own conceptions of justice and order. The works of these lesser-known writers often mattered as much as those of well-to-do politicians and better-known intellectuals. In addition, there were thinkers and writers who migrated to Egypt to escape the censorship that increasingly threatened the Ottoman Empire after 1876 and then stayed on to publish newspapers, journals, and books. All of these individuals and groups contributed to the growth of the Arabist idea.

As the Arabs organized to resist foreign occupation in the early twentieth century, a debate developed over which elements of the Arab heritage could best be employed as symbols around which to shape the image of Arab states. Some Arab writers continued to assert the primacy of Islamic bonds, while others, like the Syrian thinker and educator Sati’ al-Husri (1880–1967), rejected Islamic sentiments in favor of a unified Arab nation bound by ties of Arab culture. For Husri, the Arab nation consisted of all those who spoke Arabic as their mother tongue, no more and no less. Emphasizing secular components of the Arab heritage, he envisioned an Arab nation, unified politically and similar to European states.

EARLY HISTORY
Before World War I (1914–1918), the aging Ottoman Empire encompassed a large part of the Arab world. With the end of the war and the subsequent collapse of the empire, the League of Nations awarded much of the Arab world to France and Great Britain in the form of mandates. Aspiring to an independent Arab state or a federation of states from the Arabian Peninsula to the
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Fertile Crescent, pan-Arabist ambitions conflicted directly with the postwar policies of the European powers. Nascent movements supporting Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism existed well before the conclusion of World War I, and they became important considerations in the postwar peace talks on the future disposition of the former Ottoman territories. In this sense, the evolution of Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism as related movements was to some degree, albeit not entirely, a product of World War I and the subsequent dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

The period between the Young Turk revolt in 1908 and the creation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 was decisive for pan-Arabism. Arabist ideologies were the product of small numbers of people with diverse backgrounds and competing goals, with diversity more than continuity often characterizing their content and emphasis. After 1908, Arabist elements tended to identify with the liberal opposition to the ruling Committee for Union and Progress (CUP); nevertheless, most Arabs remained Ottomanists until after World War I, with Arab nationalism directed against Ottoman Arabs as much as it was against Ottoman Turks.

INTERWAR PERIOD

Arab attention in the ensuing two decades focused on obtaining political independence from European control as opposed to broader discussions of social reform or the adoption of a particular political system. In the process, budding Arab nationalism and vague formulations of Arab unity became increasingly intertwined with support for Palestinian Arabs in their opposition to Jewish land purchase and immigration. Syria became a center of Palestinian insurgent activity during the Arab revolts that began in 1936, protesting Zionism and Jewish settlement. In September 1937, for example, the pan-Arab movement made itself known at a congress that met in Palestine directly against the distant Jewish community. Unable to express their growing anger over events in Palestine along the southern shore of the Mediterranean as they were to their compatriots elsewhere in the Middle East.

As late as World War II (1939–1945), pan-Arabism in the sense of a political movement aimed at unifying the Arab nation remained centered on Iraq, Syria, and the Arabian Peninsula. The Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), founded in Beirut in 1932 by Antun Khalil Sa‘da (1904–1949), a Greek Orthodox intellectual, called for the creation of a Greater Syria, encompassing Cyprus, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine. Essentially a Syrian nationalist at the outset, Sa‘da was later compelled to widen the horizons of his nationalism to emphasize its Arab qualities.

In turn, the Arab Socialist Resurrection (Ba‘th) Party, officially founded in Syria in 1947, called for comprehensive Arab unity in the form of a single Arab state stretching from the Arabian Sea to the Atlantic Ocean. While the three founders of the Ba‘th Party—Michel Aflaq (1910–1989), a Greek Orthodox Christian from Damascus; Salah al-Din Bitar (1912–1980), a Sunni Muslim also from Damascus; and Zaki Arsuzi (1900–1968), an Alawi Muslim from Alexandria—seemed an unlikely trio to effect revolutionary change in society and politics, they shared a belief in Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism, defining the latter as a unitary Arab state. Over much of the next three decades, Ba‘thism flourished in Syria, and Ba‘thist ideology also enjoyed some prominence in Iraq in the 1950s and 1960s. Following his rise to power in November 1970, Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad (1930–2000) co-opted pan-Syrianism into what has been characterized as Syro-centric Arabism, and the Ba‘th Party, together with the SSNP, cooperated as never before.

In contrast to these pan-Arab movements in the Fertile Crescent, neither Egypt nor the Maghrib, the western Arab world, played a significant role in the development of pan-Arabism until the end of World War II. In Egypt, attention in the interwar period focused on the creation of Egyptian nationalism. In the Maghrib, evidence of nationalist feeling was visible, especially in Tunisia, where the Neo-Destour Party was created in 1934 with future president Habib Bourguiba (1903–2000) a prominent member of its political bureau; however, nascent nationalist movements across North Africa generally lacked unity and direction. At the same time, events in Palestine were as troubling to Arabs as anywhere else in the Middle East. Unable to express their growing anger over events in Palestine directly against the distant Jewish community in Palestine, Arabs from Egypt to Morocco often vented it locally against Jews who in most cases had little or no connection to Zionism.

POST–WORLD WAR II ERA

After World War II, with the League of Nations mandating revoked, many Arab nations achieved independence. In Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970) and the Free Officers movement seized power in 1952. While they inherited the nationalist ideology that had developed in the interwar period, the ideology behind the Egyptian nation-building process had become outdated in terms of mid-twentieth-century political and social conditions. Instead, Nasser argued that the Arab nations enjoyed a unity of language, religion, history, and culture, which
they should build on to create their own system of cooperation and defense.

Nasser began to assume the role of all-Arab leader as early as the spring of 1955, when he launched a concerted diplomatic offensive against the Baghdad Pact, a regional defense body sponsored by the West to counter Soviet military threats. His trip to the Bandung Afro-Asian conference in April 1955, a large arms deal with Czechoslovakia in September 1955, and his nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956 constituted further steps on the road to pan-Arabism. By the end of 1956, his pan-Arab policy was fully crystallized, and Nasser was universally recognized as the leader of pan-Arabism.

The peak of both Nasser’s popularity and pan-Arabism as a political movement occurred between the July 1956 Suez crisis and the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. In February 1958, Egypt and Syria proclaimed the United Arab Republic (UAR), a formal union that appeared a precursor to wider Arab unity. Backward Yemen soon associated with the Redgling organization, and following the July 1958 revolution in Iraq, the latter was also expected to join. In the end, Iraq failed to associate, and the early momentum in support of formal Arab unity was soon lost. In September 1961, Syria seceded from the union, and ties with Yemen were cut in 1962.

Following Syria’s withdrawal from the UAR in September 1961, Nasser introduced Arab socialism into Egyptian revolutionary ideology. Thereafter, the Nasserists viewed a socialist revolution as a prerequisite to Arab unity. As a result, a core premise of Arab nationalism, unification of all Arab states from the Arabian Peninsula to the Atlantic Ocean, lost its primacy and became conditional on the success of a socialist revolution in each Arab state. This shift in policy was fully visible by 1962 when Nasser replaced the National Union, formally established in May 1957, with the Arab Socialist Union as Egypt’s sole political party. The socialist trend in the Arab world was further strengthened by the subsequent declaration of a socialist state in an independent Algeria.

The Arab defeat in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War dealt a severe psychological blow to the prestige of Arab leaders and the confidence of the Arab people. The defeat undermined the legitimacy of key revolutionary regimes, especially the pan-Arabs in Cain and Damascus, and in particular, it discredited the Nasser regime, devaluing its policies. In the wake of the disaster, many observers viewed the June 1967 war as the Waterloo of pan-Arabism.

Several post-1967 political events in the Arab world combined to highlight the change that had taken place. With the death of Nasser in 1970, Anwar Sadat moved Egyptian foreign policy in an increasingly independent direction in which pan-Arabism was subordinated to Egyptian concerns and interests. In Syria, the elevation of Hafez al-Assad (1930–2000) in 1970 saw the Ba’hist commitment to Arab unity decline in favor of a more pragmatic ideology. In Palestine, the failure of conventional Arab armies to destroy Israel led Palestinians to resolve to do more for themselves in the guise of Palestinian nationalism. Elsewhere, nation-state nationalism and Islamist radicalism gradually supplanted whatever pan-Arabist spirit remained in the Arab world.

While on the ropes after 1967, reports of the death of pan-Arabism proved somewhat premature. The Free Unionist Officers, led by Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi (b. 1942), overthrew the Libyan monarchy on September 1, 1969, and at his first press conference in February 1970, Qaddafi produced a formula for a joint Arab politics. Thereafter, the Libyan leader repeatedly described the unification of Arab governments into a single state as an absolute necessity. Over the next two decades, he persisted in pursuing practical attempts at Arab unity even though the idea had been widely discredited elsewhere in the Arab world. From 1970 to 1974, for example, Libya engaged in serious, often prolonged, union discussions with Egypt (twice), Syria, Sudan, and Tunisia (twice).

After 1974, Qaddafi continued to promote Arab unity, but it was now more of a long-term goal as opposed to an immediately recognizable objective. The late 1970s was a period in which Qaddafi appeared to recognize more clearly the ethnic, political, and other divisions in the path of pan-Arabism, although he still refused to accept them. In September 1980, Libya and Syria proclaimed a merger, declaring their determination to form a unified government; however, the obstacles they faced in doing so were not so surprising. In 1984, Libya and Morocco announced a federation, known as the Arab-African Union, in which both parties retained their sovereignty. This new organization provided for considerably less that Qaddafi’s oft-stated goal of full and integral Arab unity and lasted less than two years. Five years later, Libya joined Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia in creating the Arab Maghrib Union, a regional organization modeled after the European Community and intended to promote economic cooperation, not political union. Frustrated with numerous failed attempts to promote pan-Arabism in terms of practical political union, Qaddafi later turned his attention to African unity, calling as early as 1999 for a United States of Africa.

DECLINE OF PAN-ARABISM

Since the death of Egyptian president Nasser in 1970, no Arab leader has enjoyed significant, prolonged political support outside his own country. In part for this reason, various attempts over the years to unite different Arab countries have succeeded in only one case, the union of
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North and South Yemen in 1990, and pan-Arabism as an ideology played little or no role in that instance. Loyalty to contemporary Arab regimes is more often based on ethnic, tribal, or regional grounds, for example the monarchies in the Arabian Peninsula and Morocco, or on repression and coercion, as in Libya and Syria.

On the other hand, issues of national identity have become increasingly important in many parts of the Arab and Islamic world. Non-Arab ethnic minorities, which historically posed no serious threat to established governments, have assumed new political roles with often-divisive national and international overtones. Examples include the Kurds in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey; Berber minorities in North Africa; and the Tuareg in particular in the Sahel regions of Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, and Niger.

By the 1990s, Islamist political movements, inspired in part by the Iranian Revolution of 1979, were also growing in popularity and strength throughout the Arab world, often supplanting the earlier enthusiasm for pan-Arabism. These movements promoted conflict between the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds and often also led to clashes between Sunni and Shi'a factions, notably in Iraq.

Finally, the Israeli-Palestinian imbroglio, once a powerful motivator for pan-Arabism, increasingly became a source of discontent and disunion as the Arab world divided between rejectionists and those states willing to seek accommodation with Israel. In consequence, the time of discontent and disunion as the Arab world divided between rejectionists and those states willing to seek accommodation with Israel. In consequence, the time of discontent and disunion as the Arab world divided between rejectionists and those states willing to seek accommodation with Israel. In consequence, the time of discontent and disunion as the Arab world divided between rejectionists and those states willing to seek accommodation with Israel.

ETHNICITY: ZIONISM

Zionism is an ethno-national ideology and a social movement that aimed to create and sustain a homeland for the Jewish people in the land of Zion (Palestine). Ideologically, Zionism advocated the right of (national) self-determination for the (ethnic) Jewish people; practically, it sought to create a Jewish demographic preponderance in Zion. Emerging in the late nineteenth century, Zionism reached its historical apex in 1948 with the establishment of the State of Israel, but Zionism as a movement continues, with a congress meeting every two years to preserve and promote the unity of the Jewish people and the centrality of Israel in Jewish life. Furthermore, opponents of Israel still refer to the state as the “Zionist entity.” Contested from its outset, the Zionist movement has faced numerous challenges from within and without, sparking popular controversy amongst the public, the media, and academia. This entry traces the emergence, realization, and, briefly, the consolidation of the Zionist idea and praxis.

EMERGENCE: FROM ETHNO-RELIGION TO ETHNO-NATIONALISM (THE NINETEENTH CENTURY)

Zionism emerged in response to the challenges of modernity. In 1808, Jews worldwide numbered approximately 2.5 million, with about one million living in the Middle East, and the rest in Europe. The industrialization of Europe brought about a geo-demographic upheaval. By 1881, the year usually depicted as the onset of Zionism, while Jews in the Middle East still numbered one million, in Europe their number had soared to nearly seven million, the vast majority living in Eastern Europe. Zionism surfaced here and, almost concomitantly, in Central and Western Europe for distinct but interrelated
reasons. Despite this enormous increase in population, modernity signaled to European Jews not only opportunities, but acute, often existential, perils.

Until modern times, the Jews preserved, and were preserved by, an ethno-religious tradition bolstered by the isolation imposed on them by their host countries. Their ethnic identity encompassed a sense of kinship, as if belonging to one extended family. Jewish peoplehood is predicated on this self-perception of a “fictive superfamily” (this intersubjective view makes the community an ethnic rather than an objective collectivity). The key marker of Jewish peoplehood had been religion: the metaphysical belief and the routine praxis of Judaism was to believe in God and to follow his commandments. But the wave of nationalism that followed the Enlightenment challenged the ethno-religious synergy: ethnicity became the harbinger of the nation, and religion was often depicted as a relic of the premodern past. The tension between Jewishness (the ethnic identity) and Judaism (the religious dimension) came to a head: can (should) a Jew be secular? Conversely, can one maintain Jewish religious belief without being part of the (ethnic) Jewish people? These quandaries raised the question: should Jews retain their unique collectivity and, if so, how? The “should” preoccupied Jews in Western and Central Europe; the “how” preoccupied Eastern European Jews.

In Western and Central Europe, the process of emancipation dominated the sociopolitical agenda. Beginning in France in the late eighteenth century, Jews were gradually granted full and equal citizenship. Freed from the ghettos, Jews were faced with preserving a unique collectivity while integrating into the general population. Integration was characterized by urbanization, secularization, and education. Trade and banking, in particular, provided a fast track to social mobility. Jews began to make their mark in cultural and intellectual life, in politics, and even in the army.

But integration came with a price: for a significant minority, it prescribed assimilation. Radical assimilation endorsed conversion, curting ties with Judaism and Jewishness in an attempt to integrate fully into the general society. A more moderate view of assimilation proposed divorcing religion from ethnicity, adhering to the former but renouncing the latter, following the call of Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786), the forerunner and founder of the Haskalah (the Jewish Enlightenment movement). Mendelssohn had sought to revive Jewish religion and culture (reinterpreted to fit modernity), but he identified with the German people. This path eventually led to the formation of such movements as Reform and Conservative Judaism, which later flourished in the United States.

Zionism in Central and Western Europe emerged against this backdrop. Primarily a product of disillusionment, it increasingly saw emancipation as a dead end. The leading figure in this national reawakening was Theodor Herzl (1860–1904), a Hungarian-born journalist who became the father of political Zionism. The Dreyfus affair persuaded Herzl that emancipation could not end anti-Semitism, and assimilation was accordingly futile. Only the establishment of a Jewish state could offer a real solution to the Jewish problem.

The year following the publication of Herzl’s Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State), he convened the first World Zionist Congress (1897) in Basel, Switzerland. The Basel Program stipulated that “Zionism aims at establishing for the Jewish people a publicly and legally assured home in Palestine.” This remained the primary goal of Zionism.

Though most of the first Congress’s participants were from Eastern Europe, their path to Zionism differed from that of their Western European counterparts. In Russia, where by the late nineteenth century more than five million Jews lived, there was no emancipation until the 1917 revolution. Consequently, assimilation was rarely perceived as a viable option by Jews in Eastern Europe. Economic hardship and waves of violent anti-Semitism triggered Jewish calls for new survival strategies, for both the individual and the collective. Zionism was but one of these. Most Eastern Europeans chose to fight for their rights within their own countries or to decamp to the United States, which, between 1881 and 1914, absorbed some 2.5 million Jews.

A small minority, however, began to regard the fight (for rights in Europe) or flight (to the United States) as inapt strategies. Thus Leon Pinsker (1821–1891), a Russian-Polish scholar initially dedicated to integration in Russian society, became disillusioned following the pogroms of 1881 to 1882, and wrote Selbstemanzipation (Auto-emancipation), the first Zionist manifesto. Like Herzl, Pinsker saw anti-Semitism as a consequence of the anomaly of Jewish life, which could be normalized by establishing a homeland for the Jews.

Thus these two distinct societies converged in describing a similar predicament for Jews and prescribing a similar, Zionist, solution. Religious identity became subservient to a Jewish ethnic identity. At the outset of The Jewish State, Herzl proclaimed: “We are a people—people [ein Volks]” (p. 76). The next step led naturally to a national conclusion: the self-determination of nations, which had become a rallying cause in the mid-nineteenth century (most conspicuously in the 1848 “Spring of Nations”), became a core Zionist contention and its answer to the challenges of modernity.
REALIZATION: FROM NATION TO NATION-STATE (THE FIRST HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY)

Jewish ethno-national self-determination was constantly contested from both within and without, especially by the Arabs, who constituted an overwhelming majority in the Middle East. Although the idea of a Jewish national homeland was at times provisionally accepted by certain Arab leaders, most prominently Emir Feisal I (1885–1933; later the king of Iraq), the Arab elite and people largely rejected Jewish self-determination in Palestine. This rejection was not exclusive to Arabs; it was shared by others, among them many Jews. The assimilationsists abhorred the notion of a Jewish nation. Others, notably the ultra-Orthodox, regarded Zionism as a sin against God. Still others argued that Jewish survival lay in attaining truly equal rights (or perhaps autonomy) in the Diaspora. Even among supporters of a Jewish homeland, some preferred a subsovereign, rather than a fully independent, polity. Indeed, Zionism was accepted among the majority of Jews only after the horrors of the Holocaust.

Within the gradually increasing Zionist camp there were lively debates regarding the movement’s prime purpose and strategies. Following are the five main points of contention within the Zionist movement.

The first point of contention concerned operative priorities: would the end-goal be better served by negotiating with empires to secure their agreement or by encouraging immigration, settlement, and land acquisition in Palestine? The debate focused on how to best allocate limited resources. Herzl was a strong proponent of the diplomatic course. His activities made the world aware of the Zionist cause and provided an organizational basis, but fell short of securing the desired charter. Chaim Weizmann (1874–1952; Israel’s first president) advocated a synergetic approach. His diplomatic efforts peaked with the Balfour Declaration (1917), wherein the British government stated that it “views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.”

Diplomacy, however, was accompanied by increasing investment in immigration and settlement. The first two waves of Jewish immigration to Palestine, still under Ottoman rule, brought fewer than 80,000 to the land. With the 1923 British Mandate (which incorporated the Balfour Declaration) in place, immigration increased, peaking at 250,000 during the 1930s, driven mainly by anti-Semitism in Europe. (Doubtless, the closure of U.S. gates to mass immigration made Palestine a viable alternative.) Concomitantly, Zionists invested significant funds in the purchase of land from Arabs, who were, overall, more willing to sell than the Zionists were able to buy. Jewish settlements were established mainly in the coastal plain, in the Jerz’el and Huleh valleys, and along the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem road.

The second point of contention revolved around the movement’s raison d’être: was Zionism primarily about Jewish physical-political survival or about cultural revival? Again, the heterogeneous and dynamic nature of the movement prescribed a hybrid approach. Although some Zionists argued that an independent Jewish polity was primarily a spiritual vehicle, necessary for reinventing the Jewish person and collective in modernity, most regarded culture as secondary to survival. The revival of Hebrew as an everyday language, beyond its basic liturgical usage in the Diaspora, played a pivotal role in the debate. Initiated by Eliezer Ben-Yehuda (1858–1922) in the late nineteenth century, the Hebrew project triggered a “war of words.” Could Hebrew, should Hebrew, be the primary language of education? The language battle peaked from 1913 to 1914, with Hebrew supporters coming out on top.

Religion dominated a second important aspect of the cultural debate. Zionism preferred Jewishness to Judaism. Preference, however, is not a zero-sum game. Admittedly, the movement was comprised mainly of nonreligious Jews, many of whom regarded Judaism as a relic to be discarded by the new nation. The majority, however, were not outrightly hostile to religion. Pillars of Judaism, such as reading the Bible and observing the Sabbath, were reframed to fit into the largely secular ethnopolitical project. At the same time, religious Zionism (Mizrachi), founded in 1902 in defiance of ultra-Orthodox opposition, became an increasingly important minority within the movement.

The third tension lay between geography and demography. Should Zionism strive to obtain as much land as possible or was it more important to secure a Jewish majority in less territory, and thus enable a democratic Jewish polity? And could this only be in Zion? For many early Zionists, Herzl and Pinsker included, Zion was the preferable but not the only possible place for the realization of Jewish nationalism. Historical-religious links were important but not paramount. Zionists who emphasized the “problem of Jews” over the “problem of Judaism” (i.e., the survival of the community over the revival of its culture) were prepared to consider territories other than Palestine. If conditions elsewhere provided a more feasible locus for Zionism, they argued, realpolitik should prevail.

The matter came to the fore in the wake of the Kishinev pogroms, when Britain offered a portion of British East Africa to settle the Jewish people. The proposal, called the Uganda Program, was painfully accepted by the Zionist Congress (1903), though later (1905)
rejected. Palestine thus remained the goal of Zionist aspirations and actions, but for most Zionists, while size mattered, it was more important to found a democratic Jewish state. The territorial debate resurfaced repeatedly, with the extraction of Transjordan from the British Mandate (1923), the Peel Commission partition plan (1937), and UN Resolution 181 (1947). Each time, most Zionists opted for less land in order to secure a viable independent Jewish polity. Even religious Zionism, which was rooted in the sacredness of the Land of Israel and, increasingly, in the notion of a “Greater Israel,” supported both the Uganda Program and the partition plan, following the majority view. Even the radical revisionist movement, which ideologically held fast to a “Greater Israel,” in its later incarnation (the Likud Party) was eventually willing to compromise land (such as with the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979).

The fourth point of contention related to the Zionist view of Jews living outside of Palestine. Zionism had emerged as a reaction to life in exile, and therefore one might have expected Zionists to negate Jewish life in the Diaspora. But most Zionists in Palestine retained ties with family left behind, and it was usually the conditions of life in Europe, not European Jews themselves, that were regarded as shameful. Finally, American Jewry was becoming an increasingly major exception to the rule, which gradually diminished the rule itself. However, Zionism was still regarded as the prime answer to persecution, and ultimately the Holocaust was and continues to be perceived as vindicating the Zionist premise that life in the Diaspora is innately perilous, and that without a state, Jewish existence, individual and communal alike, is at risk.

The last but certainly not the least of the tensions within Zionism concerned its relations with the Arabs. Contrary to a widespread perception, the oft-cited phrase “a land without a people for a people without a land” neither originated nor was popular among Zionists. The presence of an Arab majority in Palestine was recognized from the outset, as were the moral questions raised by choosing to settle there. Initially, many Zionists, including Herzl, believed that the political and economic blessings of modernization would help the Arab population accept a mutually beneficial coexistence. A few, notably David Ben-Gurion (1886–1973; Israel’s first prime minister), even held that local Arabs were in fact descendants of the ancient Hebrews, and thus ethnically linked to the Jewish people.

It was not until the demise of the Ottoman Empire, with the concomitant growth of Arab nationalism, that Arab opposition to Zionism was understood as the emergence of a fundamental conflict. Still, even during the British Mandate, there were Zionists who saw the conflict as either a terrible misunderstanding or a result of Zionist unwillingness to compromise. Some groups, notably the Marxist socialist Hashomer Hatzair (later, Mapam) and the more marginal Brit Shalom, even went so far as to suggest substituting a binational model for the mainstream Zionist advocacy of a Jewish independent polity. Ze’ev Jabotinsky (1880–1940) was among the first to reject, on principle, the validity of such compromises, outlining a stark description of and prescription for Jewish-Arab relations. In a milestone article, “The Iron Wall” (1923), Jabotinsky argued that no compromise could appease the Arabs, who would make peace only after losing any “spark of hope that they can get rid of us.” This view gradually became the hallmark of Zionism’s outlook vis-à-vis the Arabs. All attempts at compromise met with little or no response on the Arab side, and the path was paved to the overall clash of 1947 to 1948.

CONSOLIDATION: A STATE
IN QUESTION

“At Basel I founded the Jewish State,” wrote Herzl following the Congress of 1897, “if I said this aloud today, I would be answered by universal laughter. Perhaps in five years, and certainly in fifty, everyone will agree” (Havony 2000, pp. 123–124). Fifty years later, the United Nations voted to establish a Jewish state, and a year later, in the midst of war, it came to be. The British Mandate had allowed for internal Jewish and Arab self-government. While the Arabs failed to take advantage of this path to self-rule, the Zionist movement established sociopolitical organizations such as an internal government, political parties, labor unions, education, health care, and a defense force, and developed agriculture and industry. Thus, though the Jews were greatly outnumbered in 1948, the state was born and survived. Moreover, in the United States, home to the largest Jewish community outside Israel, Zionism—which was rejected by Reform Judaism, the largest group among American Jews—is now accepted and has even become a major part of Jewish life. In recent times, it has gained significant support from (largely evangelical) Christians who see Israel as some sort of cosmic clock. Consequently, America’s pro-Israel lobby, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), has become a significant factor in U.S. politics. Prime facie, Zionism was realized and has broadened its base of support. Why, then, does it remain a contemporary issue?

First, the tensions within the movement discussed above continued after the founding of the state and still drive the political divisions in modern Israel. Second, there is an unavoidable tension between the ideal and the real. For example, although Israel has become home
to the largest Jewish community in the world, most Jews still live outside Israel. A deeper reason, however, derives from the normative fragility of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Economically, Israel has the most robust market in the Middle East; militarily, it commands an advanced army and a vast arsenal of nuclear weapons. Levels of health and education measure up to those in other developed countries. Israel has a long tradition of peaceful governmental changes through democratic elections, and its citizens enjoy various liberal liberties. However, Israel’s right to exist is a continuous bone of contention, not least within Israel itself.

This normative challenge persists for three main reasons, including, first, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the derivative clash between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews. While Israel’s right to exist was denied by Arab regimes from the outset (often by framing the Jewish state as an aggressive colonial enterprise), since 1967, with the occupation of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, leaders and public opinion in many non-Arab countries have likewise argued not just against Israel’s policy but its policy. Moreover, leaders of Israel’s substantial Arab minority increasingly call for substituting a binational state for a Jewish state (alongside a Palestinian one).

Second, Zionism’s ethno-national foundation and religious dimension have become heavily contested aspects of nationalism. Although many democratic states exhibit similar patterns of attachment to their ethnic communities in the diaspora (e.g., Bulgaria, Hungary, Ireland, Finland, Greece, Armenia, Germany), and many hold a revered place for religion in the official public space (e.g., Greece, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Italy), Israel is often depicted as unique (and thus nondemocratic) in both respects.

Third, Israel faces acute demographic problems. Zionism envisioned millions of European Jews immigrating to the Jewish state, securing its Jewish character and democratic regime. Jabotinsky, for example, wrote of a state where the prime minister would be a Jew, with an Arab deputy, or vice versa. The Holocaust shattered these dreams. Zionism’s ability to sustain its democratic-demographic balance depends increasingly on redrawn geopolitical lines.

Thus, while Zionism succeeded in creating Israel, Israel itself still finds a question mark hovering over its very existence.

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Uriel Abulof